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ABSTRACT
Our model examines the allocation of medical research funds at the National
Institutes of Health using public interest theory, incremental budgeting theory, and
special interest group theory. We use the allocation of research funds among various
diseases and measures of the burden of disease on the population to test the hypothesis
that the N.I.H. is allocating funds on a pure public interest basis, to test for incremental
budgeting effects, and to test for the influence of lobbying and other political variables
representing special interest groups. We use pooled cross-sectional, time-series data
in a one-way fixed effects model, and also use separate cross-sectional data in a
standard multiple regression model. We also evaluate the effect of political variables
on the distribution of research funds among the states.
We find evidence to support the public interest, incremental budgeting, and
special interest group theories of regulation in the operation of the N.I.H. Using the
pooled data sets, we find that the N.I.H. does not respond to changes in death patterns
over time, but does consider death patterns in the initial allocation of funding across
diseases. Funding increases primarily as a result of incremental budgeting. However,
using the more recent and more inclusive cross-sectional disease data, we find that the
burden of disease, whether measured by deaths, years of life lost, or hospital stays,
does matter in the allocation of funding among diseases, which is evidence that the
N.I.H. does consider the public interest when making funding decisions. We also find,
however, that the allocation among diseases is impacted by lobbying dollars, and that
the allocation across states is influenced by political factors, both of which provide
support for the special interest group theory of regulation.

x
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORY
1.1 Background
The National Institutes of Health (N.I.H.) is a politically popular agency which
receives budget increases even in years when agency budgets in general are being cut.1
Even though the N.I.H. has received a real increase in its budget every year since
1982, it is still not possible for the agency to fund all or even most of the proposals it
receives.

In fact, the N.I.H. rejects three out of every four research proposals it

receives.2 How does the National Institutes of Health determine which diseases
should receive research funding, and in what amounts?
The N.I.H. is the largest biomedical research institution in the world. The
decisions made by the N.I.H. potentially affect the future health of every American.
Choosing to fund research for malaria rather than pancreatic cancer, for example, may
benefit some Americans and penalize others. Consequently, Americans have a very
personal interest in understanding the decision-making process of the N.I.H. This
dissertation attempts to explain, at least in part, the decisions reached by the N.I.H..
The National Institutes of Health is part of the Public Health Service in the
Department of Health and Human Services. The N.I.H. has grown into a complex
agency employing over 19,000 people with a budget of $20.3 billion.3

'Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics o f the Budgetary Process, 4* ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1984), 33.
National Institutes of Health, “Setting Research Priorities at the National Institutes of Health,”
prepared by the Working Group on Priority Setting (Bethesda, Md.: National Institutes of Health,
1997), Internet. Available from http://www.N.I.H..gov/news/Res Prioritv/nrioritv.htm (accessed 9
October 1998).
}Setting Research Priorities, p. 9-10.

1
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The N.I.H. is headquartered on a 300-acre campus in Bethesda, Maryland. The
N.I.H. is a collection of twenty-six individual institutes and divisions, which are listed
in Table 1.1. In addition to the institutes, the N.I.H. also operates on-site a 350-bed
research hospital, a clinical center with extensive outpatient programs, a research
center for medical students, the Fogarty Center for international cooperation in
science, and the National Library of Medicine. The latter is the largest medical library
in the world.
The N.I.H. also has numerous facilities away from Bethesda.

These include

the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences in North Carolina, the N.I.H.
Animal Center in Poolesville, Maryland, a gerontology Research Center and an
Addiction Center in Baltimore, and the Rocky Mountain Laboratory in Montana.
The N.I.H. funds research by its employees at its own facilities, which is
intramural funding, and accounts for only about eleven percent of the current budget.
Most of the money received by the N.I.H. goes to fund scientists and researchers
working at universities, medical schools, and hospitals around the country. Currently
about seventy-five percent of the total money received by the N.I.H. is paid to these
scientists working on extramural grants. The remaining funds (less than fifteen
percent) go for support costs.4
The N.I.H. provides funding for over 50,000 researchers working on over
35,000 extramural Research Project Grants (RPG’s). Table 1.2 shows the number of
RPG’s and the total RPG funding for each of the last ten years. The RPG is the most

4 National Institutes of Health, “N.LH. Almanac 1999,” prepared by the Editorial Operations Branch
(Bethesda, Md.: National Institutes ofHealth, Pub. No. 99-5, 1999), 116-158.
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Table 1.1
N.I.H. Institutes And Centers
Name o f Institute or Center
Office of the Director
National Cancer Institute
National Library o f Medicine
Center for Scientific Review
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial
NIDCR Research
1948
Warren Grant Magnuson Clinical Center
1948
CC
National Institute of Mental Health
NIMH
1949
National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal
1950
NIAMS and Skin Diseases
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and
1950
NINDS Stroke
NIGMS National Institute of General Medical Sciences
1958
National Institute of Child Health and Human
1962
NICHD Development
NIEHS
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
1965
National Eye Institute
1968
NEI
Fogarty International Center
1968
FIC
National Institute of Aging
1974
NIA
1974
NIAAA National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
NIAID
1974
Diseases
NIDA
National Institute of Drug Abuse
1974
National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and
1986
NIDDK Kidney Disease
National Institute of Nursing Research
1986
NINR
National Institute of Deafness and Other
NIDCD Communication Disorders
1988
1990
NHGRI National Human Genome Research Institute
National Center for Research Resources
1990
NCRR
National Center for Complementary and Alternative
1992
NCCAM Medicine
err
Center for Information Technology
1998
Source: Office o f Communications and Public Liaison, N.LH. Almanac 1999.
Year
1930
1937
1944
1946
1948

Acronym
0D
NCI
NLM
CSR
NHLBI
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Table 1.2
N.LH. Extramural Awards By Activity
Fiscal Years 1988-2000
(Dollars In Thousands)
YEARS

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
19%
1997
1998
1999
2000

RESEARCH
GRANT
NUMBER
22.107
22,752
22,504
23,352
24,033
23,952
24,964
24,899
25,519
26,936
28,439
31,150
38,303

RESEARCH
GRANT
AMOUNT
S 4,021,486
4,3%,635
4,638,602
5,057,591
5.494.152
5,659,458
5.964,779
6,151,615
6,538.580
9,046,500
9,801,900
11,228,700
13.002.461

CENTER
GRANT
NUMBER
714
725
728
795
865
899
985
933
928
940
915
989
1,026

CENTER
GRANT
AMOUNT
S 627,297
673,670
715,638
797,673
893,798
910,562
985,549
1,020,703
1,049,893
1,088,546
1.195,763
1.424,083
1,605,613

CONTRACT
NUMBER
1,252
u u
1332
1,362
1,232
1,328
1,126
1,091
1,296
1,167
1.169
1,191
1,133

CONTRACT
AMOUNT
S 600,594
697,489
777,432
793,189
866,874
861,925
1.001.809
1,016,911
994,259
939,700
894.800
1,045,200
1.123,000

Source: Office of Extramural Research, N. .H. Awards by N.LH. Component and
funding Mechanism.

common method of funding extramural research. RPG’s are initiated by the
researcher. The N.LH. has several types of RPG's designed to give the institutes
flexibility in the awards process. Generally, all awards are classified as competing
awards in their first year of support; if support is continued for longer than twelve
months, the award is then reclassified as non-competing. Each year, about seventyfive percent of the total RPG’s are non-competing. Of the new unsolicited proposals
submitted each year, the N.I.H. funds only about one-fourth.5
The N.I.H. does not rely exclusively on investigator-initiated proposals to
determine the direction of medical research. The N.I.H. actively seeks proposals in
areas it designates “high priority or special concern.” Program Announcements and
Requests for Applications are the two methods used by the N.LH. to stimulate
research interest in areas it would like to fund.

’ibid
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Research Project Grant proposals are subject to a multi-level peer review
process. Initially, applications are reviewed by groups of non-government scientists
(called study sections) and are ranked using a loose criteria structure of significance,
approach, innovation, investigator, and institutional environment. Generally, the peerreview process occurs in the Center for Scientific Review, but N.I.H.-solicited grant
applications are usually reviewed by the institute which solicited them.

Each

application, regardless of where it is reviewed, is assigned a numerical ranking from
100 to 500, with 100 being the best. Applications with a rank of 300-500 are not
routinely forwarded to institutes for further consideration.
The proposals with the lowest (best) scores are then passed on for further
review by the individual institutes or centers. Each institute and center has its own
National Advisory Council, which makes funding recommendations. The Councils do
not have to follow the peer review ranking, and are free to consider other factors in
the award process. The Council is composed not only of scientists from the institute,
but also of members of the public with an interest in the research o f the institute.
Although RPG’s constitute the bulk of N.LH. extramural funding, the N.I.H.
also spends substantial amounts of money funding research center grants.

These

grants are generally larger than RPG’s, employ several people, and are made to a
research center to do medical research in a clinical application setting. In addition to
center grants, the N.LH. also establishes a number of research and development
contracts each year, designed to expand research into areas promoted by the N.I.H..
R&D contracts are overseen by an N.LH. staff member, but the research is done by an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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outside organization. Funding for center grants and research and development
contracts is also shown in Table 1.2.
The funding process for research proposals, research centers, and research and
development contracts is only part of the complex N.LH. budget and research funding
allocation process.

The N.I.H. does not receive a block of funding which it may

allocate among the various divisions or even among various research projects. The
N.I.H. prepares and presents to Congress each year a proposed budget, for the N.LH.
as a whole and for each individual institute, center and division. Congress and the
Administration both tinker with the figures, often altering spending for specific
diseases or projects, as well as those for centers or institutes. Indeed, Congress is
closely involved in the very structure of the N.I.H., as well as in its funding. Congress
authorizes the creation of a new institute or center whenever it feels a disease or group
of diseases needs a higher priority in the funding process. For example, Congress last
December authorized the creation of a new institute, the National Institute of
Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering, even though the (then) Secretary of the
Department o f Health and Human Services objected, citing duplication of effort and
increased administrative costs in such a move.
There is not a grand plan for medical research at the N.LH. There is no board
or body to oversee the entirety of research funding allocation. Each institute prepares
its own budget based on guidelines from the federal Office of Management and
Budget. Budget proposals to Congress are based on initial expectations of which
projects will be funded, and for how much; Congress then adjusts the budget
according to its own goals. Congress frequently holds hearings on funding levels for
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particular diseases or centers and invites public participation.

The N.LH. also

encourages patient advocacy groups and other members of the public to have input
into the budget process.
Once a budget has been agreed upon, the Director of the N.I.H. still has some
leeway in altering the budget. The Director can move up to one percent of the N.I.H.
total funding among the institutes as he sees fit. In addition, the Director also has a
discretionary fund, which he can use to fund projects outside the regular RPG process.
In this study, I will examine the allocation of research funds among the various
diseases by the N.I.H.

I seek to answer the following questions: Does the N.LH.

allocate funding according to the burden of disease on society? How much influence
does politics have in allocation decisions?

Does the lobbying of special interest

groups affect the allocation of research funds among the various diseases? Does the
distribution of research funds among research institutions across the country depend
on political influence, or can it be explained by objective criteria?

1.2 Theory
Biomedical research is a service demanded by the public because of the
benefits of improved health and longer life that result from such research. The N.LH.
is the largest single supplier of biomedical research in the world. Thus the allocation
o f the N.I.H. budget among various research projects (i.e., various diseases) can be
analyzed in the context of a demand and supply framework. The N.LH. is a federal
agency, part of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), which is a
Cabinet department under the nominal control of the Administration. However, the
N.LH. is dependent upon Congress for all its funding; therefore, the agency must

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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respond to pressures from the Congress, which in turn must respond to the wishes of
voters and special interest groups. It is reasonable to assume that both the Congress
and the N.LH. itself have some discretionary power in determining budget levels and
the allocation o f funds among the various institutes and various diseases.

1.2.1 Simple Public Interest Theory of Biomedical Research Funding
The simplest theory which could explain the allocation of N.I.H. research
funds among various diseases would be a pure public interest theory. Public interest
theory hypothesizes an altruistic motivation for the behavior of bureaucrats and
politicians; that is, they run the government (or the federal agency) in such a way as to
obtain the greatest good for the greatest number. Under such a system, the public
would demand research on those diseases which impose the greatest burden on
society.

In this idealistic world, the decision-makers at the N.I.H allocate research

funds on the basis of some burden of disease measure, such as deaths, hospital stays,
or cost of treatment.
The theoretical framework of the analysis of N.I.H. research funding allocation
under a pure public interest theory model would be that of a constrained optimization
problem, such as the model developed by Lichtenberg (199S). Lichetnberg's model
makes no allowance for the influence of Congressional politics or special interest
groups.

His model, then, would explain only the relationship between research

funding allocation and some burden of disease measure representing the voters'
interest In Lichtenberg's model, policymakers want to maximize the total number of
people cured o f disease subject to the research budget constraint

The objective

function is:
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J* = N,P! + N2P2

= N,X,a + N2X2a
where:
J* = Number of people cured

Ni = Number of people with disease i
X = Xi + X2 = Total research budget
Pi = fl(Xj) = Probability of finding a cure, which depends only on research funding.

The assumption that the probability of finding a cure is the same for all
diseases does not reflect the realities which exist in scientific research. However,
allowing the probability of success in research to vary by disease demands a method
of estimating these probabilities, which is not currently available. Also, the United
States has no reliable sources for either the incidence or prevalence of many diseases.
Neither the Centers for Disease Control, the National Center for Health Statistics, nor
any other federal agency collects such data. Estimates of the number of people who
suffer from a disease (the disease population) are, except in rare cases, only guesses.
Thus, measures of the burden of disease must be restricted to forms such as total
deaths or hospital discharges, for which data are available. Because of the lack of data
on both disease populations and the probabilities of successful research, Lichtenberg's
model is approximated by estimating the relationship between research funding for a
disease and some obtainable measure of the burden of disease. We have done this in
Chapter 3.
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1.2.2 Expanded Theory of Biomedical Research Funding
In reality, the N.LH. does not operate in a ivory tower, devoted to serving the
public interest, removed from the influence of politicians, scientists, or patient
advocacy groups. Lichtenberg's model must be modified to reflect the political reality
of the world in which the N.I.H. operates. We expand Lichtenberg's model to include
not only variables which measure the burden of disease, but also those representing
the forces of politics and special interest groups. The following system of equations
can be used to identify and isolate determinants of the allocation of N.LH. funds:
Demand N.LH. Research Fundsit = D(VIit, SIGu, St)

(1.1)

Supply N.LH. Research Fundsit = S(CONGPOL„ NfflSUB;,, NIHPOL,, PAt)

(1.2)

N.LH. Research Funds;, = Demand N.LH. Funds^ = Supply N.LH. Funds;,

(1.3)

N.LH. Research Fundsit = fl(VIit, SIGit, CONGPOL,)

(1.4)

where
VI„

= Voters’ (public) interest in research on disease i in year t

SIGjf

= Special Interest Group pressure for research on disease i in year t

S,

= Relative political power of voters and special interest groups in year t

CONGPOL,

= Congressional politics in year t

NIHSUB,,

= N.LH. grant submissions for research on disease / in year t

NIHPOL,

= Internal politics at N.LH. in year t

PA,

= Principal-Agent relationship with Congress in year t

1.2.2.1 The Demand Equation
According to Equation 1.1, the demand for N.LH. research funding for disease
i in year t depends on voters' interest (VI;,), the pressures of special interest groups
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(SIGit), and the structure of the political system with respect to the relative political

power of voters and interest groups (St). Let us consider the measurement of each of
these variables and their relationships to the allocation of N.I.H. grants.
The inclusion of a public or voters' interest variable in Equation 1.1 is based on
the assumption that, at least in part, the allocation of public funds to biomedical
research is done to maximize the public welfare. It is also reasonable to assume that
communicable diseases will draw more public support than diseases which affect only
an isolated population. Members of the public make their demands known through
their votes, as well as expressions o f concern to both Congress and the N.I.H. directly.
To serve the public's or voters' interest, the N.I.H. will be forced to allocate additional
funds to those diseases which have the greatest impact on the public.
The N.LH. is a federal agency whose budget is determined each year by
Congress. The N.I.H., in fact, does not have a global budget which is divided up by
scientists working only for the good of the public. The N.I.H. submits a separate
budget request for each center and institute (twenty-six in all). Both the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress can adjust the total amount for each
institute, as well as the allocation of each institute's budget to various diseases. In
addition, Congress can and does dictate specific amount of money to be dedicated to
specific research topics. These are called Congressional directives.
Thus, the theory must be adjusted to allow for the goals and objectives of
individual member of Congress, as well as politicians in the Executive Branch. The
input o f politicians must be considered, and their goal may in fact be to get re-elected,
not to improve the public welfare. Consequently, the influence of voters and special

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
interest groups will determine the amount of interference by Congress or Executive
Branch appointees in the research allocation process. These groups or individuals
have goals which may or may not be compatible with the public interest.

People who

suffer from a disease, say, diabetes, will have an incentive to urge Congress to allocate
additional funds for diabetes research. The benefit to them will be large, while the
cost of research will be spread over the entire tax base. As a result patient advocacy
groups will each be motivated to act to increase research funding for their disease.
The allocation that results from their activities may not be the welfare-maximizing
allocation.
The literature on the theory of regulation and special interest groups, as
developed by Becker (1983), Olson (1965), Peltzman (1976), Stigler (1971), and
Wilson (1974) fits well with a cursory examination of the funding process for the
N.I.H.. Wilson noted that the funding of kidney dialysis under the Medicare program
was a triumph o f an interest group and reflected the truth of the concentrated benefits
and diverse costs philosophy.6
Mancur Olson in The Logic o f Collective Action (1965) analyzed the
motivation behind the process of groups, noting that political power is vested in a
number of powerful special interest groups, none of which represent the majority of
the voters or citizens of the United States. The potential gain to any individual from
lobbying efforts is quite large; on the other hand, there is a substantial free rider
problem in large groups. Consequently, small groups will win benefits at the expense

6 James Wilson, “The Politics of Regulation,” in Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament
(Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1974), 135-136.
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of large, unorganized groups. Olson explained the political power of small business
groups, unions, and professional associations using this model.
George Stigler developed a model of special interest group theory in ‘The
Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971). Stigler argues that the public interest view
of regulation does not explain most economic regulation and ignores political reality.
The special interest group has much greater motivation to seek beneficial regulation
than the general public does to oppose it: the benefits for the interest group members
will be substantial, while the cost to any individual member of society will be quite
small. Therefore, the incentive of any individual to work to prevent special group
regulation is negligible.
Becker (1983) further developed Stigler’s theory. He concurred with Stigler
that politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size of the groups
taxed to pay their subsidies. Only groups that are efficient at eliminating free riding
become politically powerful, which parallels the concentrated benefits, diverse costs
philosophy. Special interest groups purchase votes in legislatures through lobbying
and other political activities. Peltzman (1984) used a simple principal-agent model to
explain voting behavior by members of Congress. Congressmen respond to the
interests of those who contribute to the election effort, through donations or political
activity. Peltzman concludes that legislators are not shirking; they are representing the
interests of the groups which got them elected.

Special interest group theory is

rational.
Special Interest Groups (SIG) can be expected to lobby the Congress (and the
N.I.H.) and to provide campaign contributions and votes to members of Congress in
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pursuit of increased funding for particular diseases.

In this study, we proxy the

influence of advocacy groups by a simple registered lobbyist dummy variable and
additional dummy variables indicating the level of lobbying expenditures.
The structure of the political system (S) reflects the relative political power of
voters and special interest groups. This balance of power may be altered over time. It
is widely believed that the legalization of political action committees (PACs) in 1973,
which were subsequently confirmed by the courts, may have enhanced the relative
power of interest groups. Similarly, recent proposed changes in campaign finance
laws may alter the relative power of interest groups in the future. For our observation
period, no major changes were enacted in campaign finance law, so this variable is
excluded from our final reduced-form Equation 1.4.

1.2.2.2 The Supply Equation
According to Equation 1.2, the supply of N.I.H. research funds to disease i in
year t depends on Congressional politics (CONG-POLt), N.I.H. grant submissions
(NIH-SUBit), N.I.H. politics (NIH-POLt), and the principal-agency relationship (PAt)
between Congress and the N.I.H. The congressional political factors which may
influence the allocation of N.I.H. research grants across diseases from year to year
include: (1) which political parties control the House, Senate, and Presidency, (2)
who chairs particular committees in the Congress; (3) the member composition of the
committees and their geographic constituency of voters and special interest groups.
Data on congressional political factors is available and is included in our model. A
final aspect of congressional politics which influences N.I.H. grant expenditures is the
concept of "incremental budgeting."
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When examining the budgeting process by agencies o f the federal government,
the starting point is the incremental budgeting model developed by Aaron Wildavsky
in his 1964 book The Politics o f the Budgetary Process. Wildavsky demonstrated that
government bureaus do not use zero base budgeting; that is, beginning with a budget
of zero dollars and evaluating each program expenditure each year in comparison with
all other possible programs. Furthermore, he suggested that doing so is not efficient,
given the size and complexity of the federal budgeting process. Instead, agencies
modify the previous year's budget in relatively inconspicuous ways, gradually
expanding existing programs or requesting small amounts for new programs. This
process generally results in slowly expanding budgets; the incremental change may be
either large or small, but it is still an incremental increase in last year's funding. We
analyze the incrementalism present in the N.I.H. budget by comparing trends of
institute budgets.
Wildavsky also incorporated some special interest theory into his work,
discussing the importance of building relationships with key Congressmen, those who
sit on the committees overseeing an agency, or on the powerful appropriations
committees. He noted that committee recommendations on agency budgets are almost
always accepted by the entire chamber.7 In addition, Wildavsky emphasized the
importance o f building an identifiable clientele for agency services, and making sure
the agency clientele provides positive feedback to Congress on the agency's behalf. In
particular, Wildavsky noted that the N.I.H. would sometimes cut requested funding for
popular research programs, such as cancer research funding, when asking for increases
in administrative expenses or less popular items such as dental research;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

their

16
expectation was that Congress would restore the politically popular cancer funding.
They were correct.
In theory, the N.I.H. is responsible to Congress, which approves the N.I.H.
budget, monitors its decisions, and helps to set its policies. The N.I.H. is therefore an
agent which represents its principals' (i.e., the Congress) interests. The nature of this
principal/agent relationship may change over time in response to perceived crises and
changes in public opinion; Congress may become more or less active in its supervision
of the N.I.H. from period to period. In our observation period, Congress exercised a
high level of control over the budgeting process of the various N.I.H. Institutes and
Centers. In addition, Congress maintained the power to specifically order research on
a partial disease or spending in a certain area, which they exercised from time to time.
They did not pass any legislation altering their degree of control over the N.I.H., or
charging the administrative status of the N.I.H. Therefore, because no significant
changes occurred in the nature of the N.I.H./Congress relationship, we can drop the
CONGPOL variable in our final reduced-form Equation 1.4.
Most of the N.LH.'s funding for research is allocated through external
Research Project Grants (RPG's). RPG's are initiated by research proposal submitted
by non-N.I.H. researchers. Thus, the allocation of N.I.H. research funds to disease
categories is in part dependent on the research proposals submitted to the N.I.H.
(NIHSUB).

However, there is no data available to the public on the proposals

submitted but not approved for funding (about seventy-five percent of proposals
submitted). Consequently, we make no attempt to model such submissions, so that
NIHSUB is not included in our final reduced-form Equation 1.4.

7 Wildavsky, 51.
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N.I.H. politics (NIHPOL) also plays a role in the allocation of research dollars.
The N.I.H. does not rely exclusively on investigator-initiated proposals to determine
the direction of medical research. The N.I.H. actively seeks proposals in areas it
designates “high priority or special concern.” Program Announcements (PA) and
Requests for Applications (RFA) are the two methods used by the N.I.H. to stimulate
research interest in areas it would like to fund. However, the process underlying the
decision to issue a PA or RFA is not made known to the public; consequently, this
variable is not included in our final model.

1.2.23 Equilibrium Determination
According to Equation 1.3 of our model, the allocation of N.I.H. research
funding among diseases will be determined by an equilibrium between the demand for
and supply of such funding. Like previous researchers, we do not attempt to estimate
the structural Equations 1.1 and 1.2 because of difficulty in obtaining the relevant
data. Many of the theoretical structural variables are omitted from the reduced-form
equations either because they did not change over the observation period or no
empirical proxy variable was available to capture their effects. Therefore, we are
forced to estimate variations of the reduced-form Equation 1.4 using different data
sets. Nevertheless, the estimated reduced-form equations are far more sophisticated
and theoretically complete than previous models that have been estimated to explain
the allocation of N.I.H. research funds.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
The allocation of government medical research funding is not a topic which
has been extensively studied, primarily because of the lack of useable data. Most
analyses of the National Institutes of Health which have been undertaken have focused
on areas other than the social welfare economics of research funding. Analyses of the
special interest and political factors impacting the National Institutes of Health are
more plentiful, but the lack of hard data has been a problem for them, also.

2.2 General Medical Research Funding
Some of the earliest work on the social welfare economics of medical research
was done by Weisbrod (1961). He theorized that medical research funding should be
allocated according to some definable mechanism based on a goal of improving the
public welfare. Weisbrod did groundbreaking work in the area of quantifying the cost
of disease: the lost production from premature death and from sickness and the direct
costs of treatment. His approach was unique in that he noted that “in addition to the
loss o f a producer, a death also involves the loss of a consumer.”1 Consequently,
Weisbrod used the value of future earning net of consumption when calculating the
cost o f premature death. He also justified the concept that research expenditures
should be allocated proportionally to diseases based on the death rates from those
diseases, as the best approximation of equating the marginal benefits and m arginal
costs of research on various diseases. His was a pure public interest theory

1Burton A. Weisbrod, Economics o f Public Health (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,

1961), 35.
18
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application. The flaws in Weisbrod’s work stem from his scanty data. He examines
only three diseases: cancer, poliomyelitis and tuberculosis; and he uses data only for
1954.

While he finds that the allocation of research to each disease does not

correspond proportionally to the deaths from those diseases, his limited data makes it
very difficult to reject the public interest theory as a motive for public medical
research spending.
Eshelman (1971) examined the allocation of medical research funds using a
different approach, which was a variation of the public interest method used by
Weisbrod. He criticized Weisbrod’s ideas of deducting consumption from earnings to
measure the cost of premature death and of using death rates as an allocation
mechanism. Ehselman used gross earnings and advocated developing marginal rates
of return for research on individual disease categories. He tried to estimate directly
the rates of return for medical research on infectious and parasitic diseases and cancer,
in order to compare the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of research on those
diseases. He argued that the greatest benefit to society would be achieved not by
allocating research funds based on deaths, but by allocating the most funds to those
diseases with the most productive research. In doing so, he made some restrictive
assumptions: he excluded environmental factors such as sanitation and hygiene from
the benefits of medical research, as well as lifestyle factors such as diet, exercise or
tobacco use. These omissions certainly understated the value of medical research, as
medical research led to many of the changes in sanitation, hygiene, and lifestyle. Also,
his data set has serious problems: when estimating the equation for the rate of return
to cancer research, he used only data from the state of Connecticut on five-year
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survival rates, and only data from California for six to fifteen-year survival rates.
Because o f his restrictive assumptions and spotty data, his research is of limited
usefulness.

However, even with these problems, he still found that the marginal

benefits from medical research far exceeded the marginal costs.
Selma Mushkin’s extensive work on Biomedical research funding (1979)
highlights many of the problems associated with developing a resource allocation
model for biomedical research expenditures. She operates under a standard publicinterest, welfare-maximizing model. Mushkin’s analysis is limited by her data set; she
had access only to expenditures by institute level. The overlapping nature of the
research done by the institutes - research on leukemia and lung cancer is carried out
by both the National Cancer Institute and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood
Institute,

for example - makes institute-level

data unreliable.

Using this data,

however, Mushkin found only a basic correlation between institute funding and death
rates. No other measure of illness impact provided any explanation of funding levels.
In addition, Mushkin did not attempt to incorporate any other explanatory variables
into her equations. The fact that death rates for various diseases remained essentially
stable for long periods of time also tainted her results.

Mushkin does sketch an

interesting experimental resource allocation model for use by the N.I.H. in allocating
funding among diseases. She suggests that special interest groups, such as the March
of Dimes or the American Cancer Society, should be allowed to bid for increases in
research funding for various diseases by making contributions to the N.I.H..
Mushkin's main contribution is in her detailed effort to examine the N.I.H. and
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government medical research as a unified program. She also highlighted the real
shortcomings of the government's collection of information on research funding.
Garber and Romer (1993) examined the costs and benefits of medial research
to American society as a whole in “Evaluating the Federal Role in Financing HealthRelated Research”.

They assume that a public interest paradigm dominates the

decision-making process in government medical research funding. The two methods
available for financing the costs of research are expanded property rights (monopoly
power) and tax-financed subsidies. Policy makers must address two questions: Is the
total level of support research adequate?
monopoly power appropriate?

Is the balance between subsidies and

In order to do this, they must have quantitative

information about the costs and benefits of medical research. This is difficult to
obtain. If profits (of pharmaceutical firms, for example) are used as a measure of
benefits, they underestimate benefits because they omit the consumer surplus. The
over-consumption of medical goods and services caused by insurance also creates a
distortion in estimating the true benefits to society.
Garber and Romer theorize that the highest payoff to government spending on
medical research may come from funding research in areas where it is prohibitively
expensive to establish the system of property rights that makes private profits possible.
They use as an example the discovery by government researchers that aspirin can
prevent heart attacks. Because of the large number of firms producing aspirin, no one
firm would underwrite this research, because the profit increase from additional
aspirin consumption was shared among all the aspirin firms. In this case, government
research clearly increased consumer surplus. In another example, however, N.I.H.
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sponsored research led to the development of the drug alglucerase for the treatment of
Gaucher disease. Subsequently the N.I.H. gave the monopoly rights for this drug to a
private firm, under the provisions of the Orphan Drug Act, in order to get the drug
produced. However, the price of drug therapy is over $300,000 per year, and victims
must take the drug for life. Because there is no substitute for the drug, the monopoly
producer can charge any price and insurers will pay. Here, profits clearly exceed the
benefit to society. Garber and Romer assert that the present paucity of information on
measurable benefits and costs of research makes it extremely difficult to answer the
critical policy questions facing the federal government and American society. They
call for extensive collection of new types of data and limited social experiments to
facilitate informed decision making. They do not attempt to provide evidence that the
federal government is actually operating under a public interest model, or any other
model, for that matter.
In a departure from the prevailing public interest approaches to modeling
research funding, Ince (198S) undertakes an examination of medical research policy in
Australia in an effort to determine if special interest groups played a role in the
awarding of research grants by the Australian National Health and Medical Research
Council. Her database consists of approved applications received between 1966-1981,
and rejected applications by people who had at least one other application approved
during that period. Consequently, her data on non-funded applications is skewed and
contains an unknown portion o f the total pool of non-funded applications. Thus it is
impossible, for example, to tell which areas of research are being discouraged, or to
make any judgments about geographic discrimination.
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Ince recognizes the importance of classifying research by disease category if
useful conclusions are to be drawn from the analysis, so she assigns each application
to a particular disease based on which journals the publications resulting from the
research were published in. In this way she gets an admittedly crude estimate of the
dollars being spent on research on each disease, because the journals are classified
under one disease only, but often contain articles on several diseases. Of course, the
articles being published may not be in the journal which best corresponds to the
disease classification of the research. Ince does a basic analysis of the data to see
which, if any, of several organizational and process models drive the allocation of
research funding and the awarding of grants. Her results are mixed. Only a weak
correlation between peer-review scientific merit scores and the dollar amount of a
funded grant is revealed. She tests an interest group model, but does not find any
evidence to support it. Finally, she does not find any correlation between disease
funding levels and any burden of illness measure (death, hospital stays, office visits,
etc.). Ince's efforts represent the first attempt to actually measure the impact of special
interest groups on research allocation. Her lack of concrete results, supporting either
special interest group or public interest theory most likely stem from her limited data
and methodological problems.

2J N.I.H. Funding
Lichtenberg, in “The Allocation of Publicly-Funded Biomedical Research”
(199S) undertook one of the few studies which is an examination of the allocation of
research at the N.I.H. His is a classic social-welfare model of resource allocation. He
developed a theoretical model for efficient allocation of research funds, in which
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research for all diseases is assumed to produce equal returns, the probability of finding
a cure depends directly on research funding, and the budget for research is fixed. This
becomes a constrained optimization problem, in which the goal is to cure the most
people (maximize the public welfare). Research funding should increase with the
incidence of the disease. He estimates a simple model using data on government
funding of research taken from the CRISP (Computerized Retrieval of Information on
Scientific Projects) database. This database contains information on research grants
awarded by the federal government, primarily the N.I.H..
disease-specific, and are not included.

Many grants are not

Using data on grants made in 1995 and

classified as research on a particular disease, he constructs an estimate of the 1995
spending by the government in individual disease research.
Lichtenberg first estimates a regression using the potential years of life lost to
various disease categories in 1980 as an explanatory variable for government research
funding on each category in 1982. The source of this data is not clear. With a sample
size of 14, it is difficult to make accurate judgments. Also, the estimation method he
uses to isolate the impact o f life years lost to whites and non-whites on federal
research spending creates a collinearity problem which is not addressed. In addition,
he uses statistically insignificant coefficients to draw conclusions.
Next Lichtenberg estimates the relationship between persons living with
chronic conditions in 1990-1992 (using the National Health Information Survey) and
the CRISP data on 1995 research funding. However, he uses the number of grants
which mention a disease in the subject as the measure o f research funding, not the
dollar amount of the funding awarded. Also, grants can be counted toward more than
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one disease. Although his sample size is fifty-four chronic conditions, the nature of
the classification of condition in the NH1S makes it difficult to precisely correlate
them with the disease categories used by the N.I.H.

In summary, although

Lichtenberg sets up a useful framework for further study of the subject, his data is not
substantial enough to support any real conclusions about the allocation of research
funding by the N.I.H.
A second economic analysis of the allocation process at the N.I.H. under the
public interest theory has been done by Gross, Anderson, and Powe (1999). They
used a cross section of twenty-nine diseases, including such items as injuries, alcohol
abuse, depression, and dental disorders. They compared funding by the N.I.H. in 1996
for each of these items with various measures of the burden of disease, such as total
mortality, hospital days, and years of life lost to each disease. They made extensive
use of the Global Burden of Disease Study by the World Health Organization.
This study divided the countries of the world into eight regions, with the
United States classified in the Established Market Economies region. Its goal was to
develop estimates of the incidence, prevalence, and mortality of various diseases
around the globe in 1990 for use in determining policies and programs for the WHO.
It also developed a new measure of the burden of disease called Disability Adjusted
Life Years (DALYs). A DALY is defined as one year of healthy life lost due to
disability or death from each disease. Gross et al used these 1990 incidence and
prevalence rates for the EME region as explanatory variables in their study. They had
no predictive power. However, they focused on the DALY as an explanatory variable,
showing that it was positive and highly significant in explaining N.I.H. funding. Their
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conclusion was that it was an excellent measure of the burden of disease, and that the
N.I.H. was indeed allocating funds appropriately.
There have been numerous criticisms of the DALY, namely that it explicitly
states that life is less valuable for disabled people than healthy people.2 It includes a
rubric which forces respondents to discount the lives of disabled people; weighting
the value of a year of life to a deaf person as equal to a year of life for a hearing person
is not permitted. In addition, the DALY computation is heavily weighted toward
people between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight. Years of life to children and
older people are weighted less than those for young-to-middle-aged

adults.

addition, future years of life are weighted less than the current year.

In

These

computational mechanisms give a result that is not necessarily in accordance with the
ideas of equity among the American population. If weights are determined by age,
why not sex, income, or race?

The fact that DALYs are correlated well with N.I.H.

funding across diseases in 1996 is not reassuring to the parents of young children or to
senior citizens. Gross et al completed the first truly rigorous analysis of the social
welfare implication o f research allocation at the National Institutes of Health. Their
major problems are the sample size and the reliance on the DALY.
In contrast with Lichtenberg and Gross, several studies analyzing the N.I.H.
have tired to determine the role that special interest groups play in the decision
making processes of the N.I.H. Carter (1974) analyzed the awarding of N.I.H. grants
to medical schools during the years 1968-1973. She worked on a project undertaken
by the Rand Institute for the N.I.H. in response to a critical report by the OMB, raising

2 Trude Amesen and Erik Nord, “The Value of DALY Life: Problems with Ethics and Validity of
Disability Adjusted Life Years,” British Medical Journal 319, no. 7222 (1999): 142S.
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allegations of conflict of interest in the peer review process, over-concentration of
funds among a few school, and the existence of an "old boys network" at the N.I.H.
She found that the applications funded were those with the highest quality, although
she did not explain the strong correlation between the probability of funding and
previous approval. Carter did not test for the influence of political and special interest
groups.
Ginzberg and Dutka (1989) provide substantial evidence of geographic
distortion in the awarding of research grants by the N.I.H., but do not provide any real
explanation for it. They also note the persistent decline in the percent of eligible
projects funded after 1975.

Their chapter on the allocation o f research funding

resources among diseases essentially concludes that this topic is problematic and,
therefore, usually not addressed.
Another study in the special interest group framework is that done by Janet M.
Cuca. In "Scientific, Social, and Other Factors in the Evaluation of Applications for
N.I.H. Research Grants" (1990), she found that non-scientific factors contributed
substantially to the probability of receiving grant funds. She also found that study
section members are, in fact, "interested parties," and that some applications are likely
to be "favored." She also noted the latitude in interpreting such abstract terms used in
the scoring criteria as "significance" and "originality." Her data set was the most
comprehensive ever used in a study of the N.I.H.: approximately 2,000 applications
for research funds for fiscal year 1982. Because she actually had data for both funded
and unfunded grants, her data is not subject to the selectivity bias present in other
work. Dr. Cuca was an employee o f the N.I.H. who used data not available to the
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public for her research. Again, her research supports the contention that forces exist
which affect the awarding of research grants that have nothing to do with maximizing
social welfare.
Kiken (1993) pursues a different approach and investigates the roles of various
interest groups in the funding process at the N.I.H.. This is helpful in that political
forces are acknowledged to be a powerful determinant on both the levels of funding
for various institutes and which diseases are pursued. She identifies several logical
special interest groups - the Administration, Congress, the N.I.H. bureaucracy, the
media, doctors/the AMA - but is unable to provide any substantive evidence of their
effectiveness in shifting research priorities. Her evidence is almost entirely anecdotal.
She gets a number of anonymous employees of the N.I.H. to confirm that special
interest groups do play a role in the decision-making process, but she has no hard data
to back up these assertions.
Brooks (1994) has a more thorough analysis of the role of special interest
groups in medical research funding. She provides some data to demonstrate that
interest groups have created shifts in research priorities by the N.I.H.. Her data set is,
like Mushkin’s, institute-level budgetary data, and consequently of limited usefulness.
A contribution of her work is a survey of executives at the N.I.H., who tend to either
deny that politics and interest groups have any influence on funding at all, or to blame
any irregularities on Congress. One interesting result revealed by the survey was that
agency executives were opposed to any coordinated plan of spending and research for
the N.I.H. as a whole, such as one based on the burden o f disease. Brooks' perception
was that such a plan would threaten the power of the bureaucracy at the N.I.H..
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An extensive article by Baird (1999) examines the policies of the N.I.H. and
the Food and Drug Administration

with respect to the inclusion of women and

minorities in clinical trials and research studies. Women were routinely excluded
from clinical trials after the diethylstilbestrol (DES) and thalidomide problems that
surfaced in the 1950’s. However, one side effect of the ban on using women of
childbearing years in clinical studies was the inability to study therapies and
treatments designed just for female diseases. Partly as a result of the women’s rights
movement o f the 1970’s,the N.I.H. established its Advisory Committee on Women’s
Health Issues in 1986. This committee was essentially ignored. The turning point for
women’s issues came in 1990, when the General Accounting Office prepared to
present a report to Congress on the treatment of women in clinical trials and research
studies by government funded researchers. Congresswomen Schroeder, Oakar, and
Lloyd, along with Senator Snowe, generated widespread publicity for the presentation
of the report. Other members of the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues took
up the cause, and in 1990 the Office of Research on Women’s Health (ORWH) was
established in the N.I.H. to ensure the participation of women in the research process
and to address women’s health issues. In 1991 the Women’s Health Initiative at
N.I.H. was begun, which was a massive study of 150,000 women designed to last until
2005. Another result of the ORWH was a sharp increase in the allocation of funds to
breast cancer, ovarian and reproductive system cancers, and osteoporosis research by
the N.I.H.

The 1993 N.I.H. Reauthorization Act prohibited researchers from

excluding women or minorities from studies and clinical trials. Baird's examination
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demonstrates a that coalition of special interest groups which achieve political power
can reap an increase in targeted research funds.
A study of the distribution of N.I.H. research awards among medical schools
(Moy, et al., 2000) highlighted the consistency of awards to the same ten schools over
the period 1986-1997. Each o f these school represents a small special interest group.
Increases in research funding to these schools result in increases in size and prestige,
and provide a valuable recruiting tool. The ten schools which received the most
funding comprise only eight percent of the nation’s medical schools, yet they
consistently garnered about twenty-five percent of the research money awarded. In
contrast, the seventy-five schools getting the least money comprised sixty percent of
the medical schools, but only received less than twenty-five percent of the money
awarded.

The study makes no attempt to explain the distribution data, other than to

note that awards to principal researchers with an M.D. increased more than the
proportion awarded to researchers with a Ph.D. over the period. The mean value of
awards to the top ten schools remained relatively constant at $197,000 (1986 dollars),
while the amount awarded to the remainder rose, though it remained substantially
below the amount awarded to top school researchers. The authors of the study noted
that the N.I.H. may influence the proportion of medical schools that conduct research.
Large increases in future N.I.H. budgets should serve to reduce concentration among
the top medical schools, while small increases in research budget may tend to increase
concentration. However, a review of the data reveals that the N.I.H. budget increased
by over one-third in real dollars from 1986-1997, during which time the concentration
of research awards among medical schools actually increased, rather than decreased.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31
This lack of variation in the awards given to the top ten schools over an extended
period of time may be evidence of special interest groups at work; conversely, it may
be an indication o f the quality of the schools.
Along with the role of special interest groups, the impact of political factors
must be considered when examining the N.I.H. Both Congress and the Executive
Branch influence the funding decisions of the N.I.H. Roessner (1970) examined the
role of the House of Representatives in controlling and shaping the National Institutes
of Health during the years 1959-1964. His emphasis was on explaining the part that
House committees played in directing the funding and activities of the N.I.H.. His
findings in some respects were similar to those of Wildavsky (1964): the true control
over the N.I.H. in Congress takes place at the committee lever, rather than on the
House floor, and Congress relied heavily on the expertise of agency personnel in
making decisions affecting the N.I.H..
Weston (1994) examined the determinants of congressional appropriations for
the N.I.H.. He used data on total funding for nine institutes over the years 1977-1993,
so his data set did not accurately permit identification of research funding to various
diseases.

His analysis supported the incremental budgeting model formulated by

Wildavsky, as current changes in an institute's budget were highly dependent on past
changes. Weston also examined interference in the N.I.H. institute appropriations
process during the year 1992 by members of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
He found that Republicans and Democrats were equally likely to participate in the
process, and that senators up for re-election participated more than those who weren't.
The N.I.H. is popular with the voting public.
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Weston assigned each institute a primary disease focus, and then computed a
cause of death ratio for each institute, which was the number of deaths from that
disease divided by total deaths for the year.

He found a significant negative

correlation between the cause of death ratio and funding for that Institute, which he
could not explain. He also found that over the years 1977-1993, N.I.H. appropriations
did not keep pace with inflation. Additional findings were that Democratic control of
Congress increased N.I.H. funding, as did an election year. Members of Congress can
improve their chances for re-election by responding to pressures from constituents.
Weston's research supports both special interest group theory and the importance of
politics in funding decisions.
Former N.I.H. Director Bemadine Healy complained that the “ability of the
N.I.H. to fulfill its mission has been eroded by relentless partisan politics.” (Healy,
1994) One problem is that the N.I.H. is classified under “Health and Welfare” in the
Office of Management and Budget, not under “Science,” as are N.A.S.A. and N.S.F..
Because the N.I.H. is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services, its
budget can be tapped for uses in the Public Health Service or by the DHHS Secretary.
In addition, the N.I.H. budget is appropriated piecemeal by Congress, as each institute
has a separately submitted and approved budget. Therefore, the opportunities for
meddling by Congress are many.

Any scientific judgment that necessitates

reallocating more than one percent of an institute’s budget requires an Act of
Congress.

These institutional factors reduce N.I.H. cohesiveness and impede

scientific progress. Also, Congress passes from time to time “reauthorization bills”
for the N.I.H. which create legally binding directives about spending, but do not
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appropriate any money for these activities. The number of specific congressional
directives about N.I.H. expenditures increased from 122 in 1984 to 260 in 1991.
Healy cites this statistic as evidence of the growing interference of Congress, which
makes it difficult for the N.I.H. to do its job. Although biomedical research is popular
with both Congress and the public, Healy asserts that the N.I.H. is not itself a
politically powerful agency, lacking the “political clout needed to confront
inappropriate political pressures.” She advocates independent agency status for the
N.I.H., similar to that of the N.S.F. and N.A.S.A. Healy, who had a long and close
relationship with the N.I.H., is a convincing authority when arguing that political
factors play a major role in the decisions made at the N.I.H..
Congress itself recognized the need to examine the decision-making process at
the National Institutes of Health in 1996, and mandated a study of the agency by the
Institute of Medicine. The results, published as Scientific Opportunities and Public
Needs in 1998, identified some definite problems with the agency's funding
determination process. The committee examined the funding allocation criteria of the
N.I.H., and found them vague and lacking in quality information. In particular, the
committee criticized the poor data collected on research funding by disease,

the

absence of reliance on quantifiable measures of burden of disease, and the lack of
high-quality data on the burden o f disease. They recommended that the N.I.H. should
gather better data on funding by the disease, the various burden of disease measures,
and the costs of disease. The N.I.H. should then use this data to help allocate funding,
and should conduct public evaluations o f the impact of their research funding on the
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burdens of disease. The Institute of Medicine report found substantial evidence that
the N.I.H. did not operate under a true public interest theory of resource allocation.
The committee noted that the N.I.H. followed a decentralized model of
decision making, with each institute making its own decisions about which projects to
fund. The report complained of the lack of an overall research plan to coordinate
research across centers.

This, they felt, contributed to the tendency of Congress and

the President to intervene in the process and set aside funding for the projects
demanded by noisy voters. The Institute of Medicine suggested that an clear, overall
strategic plan should be developed and updated regularly, and that this would reduce
congressional interference.
Another area in which the N.I.H. was not performing well was interaction with
the public. The general public, patient advocacy groups and special populations had
no clear means of input into the decision-making process. The N.I.H. was frequently
described as unresponsive to these groups.

This, in turn, increased petitions to

Congress for special intervention into N.I.H. funding decisions.

The committee

recommended that the N.I.H. establish an Office of Public Liaison in the Office of the
Director, and in each institute, to formally seek out and collect public input. The
N.I.H. has done this, which should improve its ability to perform as a welfaremaximizing agency.

2.4 Other Federal Agency Funding Studies
Another pioneer in modeling federal agency budgeting was William Niskanen.
Bureaucracy and Representative Government, published in 1971, develops a model of
bureaucratic utility. He defines the relationship between government agencies and the
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federal government as that o f a bilateral monopoly. Niskanen argues that bureaucrats
act to maximize their budget, which leads to a result that federal government output
will be larger than optimal, but will be produced at the minimum cost. He formalizes
the role of the elected legislature, based on the concept that legislators determine the
demand for various government services provided by government agencies, and then
monitor the behavior of the agencies.
The role of congressional committees is key, as it is in Wildavskys
framework. Niskanen theorizes that the committee members generally receive the
committee assignments they request;

consequently, the demand for services by

committee members will be higher than that of the median legislator. Because the
decisions of the committees are rarely overturned, this results in output that is higher
by each government agency than a randomly selected committee would approve. In
addition, because legislators have limited time, they will choose to spend very little
time monitoring bureaus, which would generate cost savings for all citizens; instead,
they devote their time to activities which affect their own constituencies and help them
to get re-elected. This results in too little monitoring. Niskanen thus argues that the
resulting budgets for federal agencies in general will exceed the social welfare ideal.
The theories of both Niskanen and Wildavsky are applicable to the N.I.H., and are
useful in explaining its behavior.
An interesting examination of a federal agency similar to the N.I.H. was
undertaken by Howard Wachtel in “How the N.S.F. Funds Research in Economics’*
(2000). Wachtel studied the peer review process at the National Science Foundation
during the years 1974-1995. During this period, the N.S.F. awarded over $200 million
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in economics research grants to universities, of which $133 million went to fifteen
schools. Wachtel argues that the stable “market share” maintained by these schools
over twenty years would be used in any other industry as evidence of a cartel.

In

contrast, the awards received by the remaining schools fluctuated widely from year to
year. In any given year, the top fifteen schools received about two-thirds of the
awards, and forty or more schools competed for the remaining one-third of available
money. Wachtel theorized that the composition of the peer review panels might have
some bearing on the award pattern he observed.

Although the N.S.F. was

uncooperative in his requests for information on peer review panels, he managed to
finally obtain the data from the Library of Congress.

He found a “remarkable

congruence” between the proportion of panel members from the top fifteen schools
(sixty-eight percent) and the percentage of grant money awarded to those schools (also
sixty-eight percent) over sixteen years.

He calls for a broadening of the awards

process to include more schools, and more access to the peer-review system.
Although his research raises interesting possibilities for examining N.I.H. research
awards, the concentration o f awards among relatively few schools may simply be a
reflection o f the quality o f the research work done at those schools.

2.5 Conclusions
Although there has been some work done on the positive rate of return from
biomedical research ( Eshelman, 1971; Mushkin, 1979; Weisbrod, 1967), there has
been surprisingly little research done in the area of optimal allocation of a given level
of funding among the various diseases. This study will be an advance over previous
studies in this area because it will examine funding by actual diseases, rather than
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institutes; I will compile a data set not previously used in this context. I will also
attempt to quantify the effects of special interest groups and political factors on the
allocation process, which has not been done before. Finally, 1 also hope to examine
the distribution of funding by geographic region in relation to various political factors.
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CHAPTER 3
TIME SERIES DATA AND REGRESSIONS
3.1 Research Funding Data
The National Institutes of Health collected data on the amount of research
funding which they devoted to various diseases only on a limited basis prior to the
mid-1990's. Information on research funding by disease was obtained from the N.I.H.
web page (http://www.N.I.H.gov) and from correspondence with N.I.H. employees.
Examination of allocation patterns by the N.I.H. from 1987-2001 is restricted to those
diseases on which they kept statistics.
The data set contains twenty-one diseases: Alzheimer's disease, asthma, breast
cancer, cancer (all types), chronic fatigue syndrome, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, EpsteinBarr virus, HIV/Aids, hypertension, kidney disease, lupus, osteoporosis, Parkinson's
disease, prostate cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, sickle cell disease, spinal cord
injury, stroke, sudden infant death syndrome, and tuberculosis. The information on
funding was obtained from the Office of Financial Management at the National
Institutes of Health.

The choice of diseases depended entirely on what funding

statistics the N.I.H. was able to provide. Surprisingly, they did not collect information
on the amount of research funding they provided for many diseases during this period,
including such major killer diseases as heart disease, pneumonia, and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease. All three of these diseases ranked in the top ten causes
of death for each o f the fifteen years being studied.

Funding information was

collected, however, for a number o f less deadly diseases such as Epstein-Barr, chronic
fatigue syndrome, lupus, and sexually transmitted diseases.

38
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Table 3.1 compares total N.I.H. funding to the amount of funding for the
diseases considered in this study. Funding for these diseases comprises from 42 to 49
percent of the total N.I.H. budget during these years. The remainder of the N.I.H.
budget was not categorized by disease.
Both the total N.I.H. budget and the amount of funding for these twenty-one
diseases increased every year during the period 1987-2001. This is true even when the
amounts are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (1984 = 100).
Figure 3.1 plots the total budget for the N.I.H. in constant dollars. The amounts are
converted to logarithmic form to compress the scale into a more manageable picture.
The slope of the curve is always upward-sloping, but clearly, the slope is not constant.
The rate o f increase in the budget amounts was less during the period 1993 to 1998
than during the years 1987-1992.

The rate of change increased again in 1999,

probably as a result of the congressional mandate to double the N.I.H. budget by the
year 2003.

3.2 Death Data
The attribution of deaths to various causes in the United States is carried out by
attending physicians' coding of death certificates. These deaths certificates are used
by the Centers for Disease Control to compile national death statistics.

This

compilation process takes about two years. Death data were obtained from the CDC
web page (http://www.cdc.gov) using their Wonder database search engine. The death
statistics for this study use the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision, for cause of death coding. Table 3.2 lists total deaths for each year 1984 1998, the latest year for which death statistics are available. Also shown is the number
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Table 3.1
Research Funding Data
(In Thousands of Nominal Dollars)
Year
N.I.H.
Data Set
Percent
Total
Total
1987
$6,180,660
$2,736,126
0.4427
1988
7,186,959
3,085,420
0.4293
1989
7,893,586
3,494,642
0.4427
1990
8,505,256
3,892,914
0.4577
1991
9,217,940
4,277,995
0.4641
1992
10,010,368
4,728,995
0.4724
1993
10,328,117
4,934,196
0.4777
1994
10,910,969
5,347,668
0.4901
1995
11,340,841
5,509,311
0.4858
1996
11,880,847
5,771,061
0.4857
1997
12,770,771
6,112,058
0.4786
1998
13,622,386
6,389,125
0.4690
1999
15,597,189
7,575,300
0.4857
2000
17,793,587
8,591,300
0.4828
2001
20,300,000
9,069,100
0.4468
Source: Office of Communications and *ublic Liaison, N.I.H. Almanac, 1999.
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Figure 3.1: Total N.I.H. Funding Over Time (1984 Dollars)
Source: Office of Communications and Public Liaison, N.L H. Almanac, 1999.
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Table 3.2
Death Data
Year
Total
Data Set
Percent
Deaths
Deaths
1984
2,039,369
701,779
0.3441
1985
2,086,440
716,705
0.3435
1986
2,105,361
728,318
0.3459
1987
2,123,323
0.3501
743,422
1988
2,167,999
759,810
0.3505
1989
2,150,466
779,183
0.3623
1990
2,148,463
791,318
0.3683
1991
2,169,518
807,541
0.3768
1992
2,175,613
820,906
0.3773
1993
2,268,553
850,276
0.3748
1994
2,278,994
868,077
0.3809
1995
884,927
2,312,132
0.3827
1996
2,314,690
881,585
0.3809
1997
2,314,245
871,353
0.3765
1998
2,337,258
874,589
0.3742
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics, Annual.
of deaths each year attributed to the twenty-one diseases in this data set.

The

percentage of total deaths examined in this study varies from about thirty-four to
thirty-eight percent. The top ten causes of death for each of the years 1984-1998 are
listed in Appendix A.

3.3 Patterns of Spending per Death
It is interesting to examine the pattern of funding by disease. Clearly, deaths
from a particular disease are one of the most relevant measures of the burden of that
disease to our society. If the N.I.H. is using deaths as a measure of the burden of
disease, and is using this information to determine what diseases deserve the most
research funding, we should see a strong correlation between the number of people
who die from a disease and the funding devoted to that disease. Also, if the N.I.H.
considers all deaths as equally catastrophic, then deaths from one disease should
weigh no more heavily than deaths from any other disease.
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Figure 3.2 shows the funding per death by disease category for the year 1994,
the mid-point of this study. The amount of research funding the N.I.H. devoted to a
disease is divided by the number of people who died from that disease. The resulting
dollar amount per death is converted to logarithmic form in order to fit all of the
diseases on one page. The graph is a scatter diagram, revealing that funding per death
varies widely depending on the cause of death. The highest level is for chronic fatigue
syndrome, which kills very few people. The lowest level is for stroke, which is the
third largest cause of deaths. A similar irregular pattern is present for each of the
fifteen years of the study (1987-2001). If funding per death were equal across all
diseases, the graph would be a horizontal line. All deaths are not equal in the eyes of
the N.I.H.. What accounts for these disparities?

Figure 3.2 Log of Research Funding Per Death 1994. Source:
Office of Financial Management, Funding by Selected Categories.
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A closer examination of the levels of funding awarded to research on the
various diseases reveals some striking differences. Table 3.3 lists the amount of
funding per death from each disease for each year 1987 - 2001. Those diseases which
caused the deaths of fewer than 1,000 persons per year during each year are marked
with an asterisk.
Those diseases which kill very few people, such as Epstein-Barr virus, chronic
fatigue syndrome, osteoporosis and sexually transmitted diseases have research
funding amounts that frequently exceed $1 million per death. Clearly, the number of
deaths does not motivate research in these areas.
Among the ten leading causes of death each year, cancer (second), stroke
(third) and diabetes (seventh) are included in this portion of the study. Cancer and
diabetes receive far more funding proportionally than does stroke. Even though the
amount funded per diabetes death actually decreased slightly during some years, and
increased only by thirty-two percent over the entire fifteen year period, the level of
funding for diabetes deaths was always at least five times higher than research funding
per stroke death. In some years, diabetes funding per death was seventeen times
higher than that for stroke.
Funding per diabetes death also exceeded that for cancer during each of the
years studied, despite the fact that cancer killed over 500,000 people per year, and
diabetes fewer than 65,000 per year. In fact, the amount of per death funding for
diabetes was greater than the amount devoted to both cancer and stroke combined for
ten of the fifteen years. Stroke research is underfunded relative to both cancer and
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Table 3.3
NIH Research Funding per Death
1987-1993 (1984 Dollars)
1993
1990
1991
1992
Disease
1988
1989
1987
20,899
13,491
18,712
21,271
10,232
12,914
Alzheimer’s
12,135
13,136
8,527
8,585
6,005
5,992
6,468
6,762
Asthma
5,244
1,890
1,972
2,121
2,363
3,597
1,640
Breast Cancer
4,404
4,364
3,800
3,995
3,490
3,583
3,864
All Cancer
678,250
2,822,000
1,557,500
197,600
736,000
479,250
111,714
Chronic Fatigue*
152,848
131,846
124,049
72,722
55,194
91,324
102,663
Cystic Fibrosis*
5,993
6,469
6,478
5,945
6,526
6,943
6,550
Diabetes
1,339,769
874,050
1,148,429
963,786
1,073,733
826,875
901,533
Epstein Barr*
42,660
67,171
47,560
60,535
81,635
75,823
59,047
HIV/Aids
18,651
17,305
14,956
16,135
Hpertension
15,404
15,485
15,995
7,332
5,319
6,996
5,467
5,615
5,875
Kidney
4,263
21,877
19,580
19,526
19,127
18,235
18,547
20,845
Lupus
126,001
128,261
108,552
119,357
64,716
63,565
82,945
Osteoporosis*
9,918
8,001
7,154
9,337
7,089
7,817
7,843
Parkinson’s
1,925
661
498
580
662
1,313
Prostate Cancer
518
670,455
714,975
601,722
606,980
744,317
417,589
619,135
STD’s*
100,989
102,394
82,940
86,677
91,331
122,193
98,791
Sickle Cell*
9,689
9,290
7,181
8,067
7,946
8,266
8,837
Spinal Cord
778
372
470
522
604
751
Stroke
367
8,372
6,877
7,939
7,560
6,209
7,454
5,369
SIDS
19,329
1,661
1,921
2,564
7,771
Tuberculosis
925
887
Source: Office of Financial Management, Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control, WONDER Mortality
Database. *caused the deaths of less than 1,000 people per year.
(Table 3.3 continued)
£
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2000
1998
1996
1997
1995
Disease
1994
20,752
18,998
16,034
18,169
17,354
20,982
20,557
Alzheimer’s
29,076
17,900
24,775
13,739
16,858
12,926
15,793
Asthma
13,380
14,372
11,616
11,932
8,392
10,948
6,981
Breast Cancer
7,148
6,260
5,164
5,077
4,558
4,676
4,851
All Cancer
857,143
1,987,500 1,300,000 1,675,000
7,765,000
787,222
5,426,000
Chronic Fatigue*
172,863
143,919
166,512
149,002
147,720
158,346
142,170
Cystic Fibrosis*
7,409
8,384
5,579
5,446
5,998
5,895
5,547
Diabetes
1,693,750
1,629,412
1,104,348
1,057,619
924,211
1,162,667
1,333,071
Epstein Barr*
57,600
121,514
35,648
37,182
37,870
39,740
HIV/Aids
43,967
13,550
14,498
13,869
15,656
18,186
16,595
15,514
Hpertension
8,105
8,725
7,110
7,223
6,991
6,593
7,248
Kidney
36,592
32,835
26,203
26,847
25,010
25,681
24,652
Lupus
116,638
124,595
120,236
116,542
110,616
131,548
122,553
Osteoporosis
12,798
11,169
8,179
10,139
8,472
9,387
Parkinson’s
9,323
5,202
7,273
2,756
3,295
2,496
2,658
2,062
Prostate Cancer
1,961,538
1,559,494 1,350,495
1,001,745
1,057,557 1,024,913
900,385
STD’s*
118,239
99,408
96,369
91,525
102,758
96,863
120,410
Sickle Cell
11,654
10,668
11,220
10,253
10,858
8,924
9,187
Spinal Cord
1,351
1,041
1,215
839
871
822
835
Stroke
18,756
16,164
11,985
13,335
9,828
8,945
SIDS
8,487
70,069
60,566
45,552
49,513
39,340
36,352
29,297
Tuberculosis
Source: Office of Financial Management, Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control, WONDER
Database, "‘caused the deaths of less than 1,000 people per year.

2001
21,606
30,765
13,140
7,528
1,575,000
189,579
8,664
1,333,333
157,282
14,426
8,862
37,097
121,147
12,562
8,422
2,545,313
115,922
11,384
1,419
20,907
78,058
Mortality
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diabetes, and cancer is also underfunded compared to diabetes, based on the number of
deaths from each disease.
Another interesting comparison involves funding for breast cancer and that of
prostate cancer. Breast cancer is almost entirely a disease confined to women, and
prostate cancer occurs only in men. Funding per breast cancer death increased 700
percent, from $1,640 per death in 1987 to $13,140 per death in 2001. Prostate cancer,
on the other hand, went from $518 per death in 1987 to $8,422 in 2001, an increase of
1500 percent. Currently, breast cancer kills about 10,000 more people per year than
prostate cancer. Is this the reason that breast cancer research receives more funding?
If so, why was the increase in prostate cancer funding almost double that of breast
cancer? In addition, cancers that are more deadly than either breast or prostate cancer,
such as lung cancer and colorectal cancer, receive less funding per death than either
breast cancer or prostate cancer.

Why are deaths from different cancers treated

differently?
The most spectacular increase in research funding per death during the years
1987 - 2001 was for tuberculosis. Funding per death was only $887 in 1987, and it
rose to $78,058 per death by 2001, and increase of 8,700 percent. No other disease
received increases of such magnitude, despite that fact that deaths from tuberculosis
remained relatively constant between 1000 and 2000 people per year for the entire
period, and there was no upward trend. Clearly, another factor besides deaths from the
disease must be causing this increase. Is it that tuberculosis is contagious?
What conclusions can be drawn from the information in Table 3.3? The N.I.H.
is not awarding research funding dollars to a disease solely on the basis of the number
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of people who die from that disease. If this were the case, diseases such as chronic
fatigue syndrome would not be receiving research funding at all. In addition, the
N.I.H. must not perceive all deaths to be equally adverse outcomes, for the deviation
in funding per death is substantial, even among those disease that kill large numbers of
people each year.

3.4 Patterns of Spending by Disease
In order to help us better understand the allocation process of the N.I.H., it is
useful to study both the level and rate of increase in the funding for research on each
of the twent-one diseases under consideration during the years 1987-2001. The next
group of graphs, Figures 3.3 - 3.24, show the log of constant dollar funding for each
disease from 1987-2001. Although all diseases posted a real increase over the course
o f the period, the slopes vary tremendously. Only Aids, breast cancer, and prostate
cancer had persistent increases.

As mentioned earlier, tuberculosis had the largest

real increase over the period, but even so, there were several years of flat growth.
Most diseases had some periods of flat budgets, and many had years of real decreases.
Again, all diseases are not treated equally by the N.I.H.
At least part of the explanation for the variation in funding stems from the fact
that the N.I.H. relied heavily on investigator proposals during the period being studied.
The N.I.H. admittedly did not have funding goals for many diseases during this time.
They were under not any constraint to spend a particular amount on research for any
disease, unless Congress specifically decreed that they do so. Congressional input will
be addressed in a later section.
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Figure 3.3: Alzheimer's Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.4: Asthma Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: N.I.H.,
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.5: Breast Cancer Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.6: Total Cancer Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.7: Chronic Fatigue Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.8: Cystic Fibrosis Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.9: Diabetes Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: Office
of Communications and Public Liaison, Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.10: Epstein-Barr Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.11: HIV/Aids Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.

Source:
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Figure 3.12: Hypertension Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.13: Kidney Disease Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H. Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.14: Lupus Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: N.I.H.,
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.1S: Osteoporosis Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.16: Parkinson’s Disease Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.17: Prostate Cancer Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.18: Sexually Transmitted Diseases Funding Over Time (Log of 1984
Dollars). Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.19: Sickle Cell Disease Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.20: Spinal Cord Injury Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.21: Stroke Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: N.I.H.,
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.22: Sudden Infant Death Syndrome Funding Over Time (Log of 1984
Dollars). Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58
Funding
tl

10

9

8

7
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year

Figure 3.23: Tuberculosis Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
In summary, examination of these descriptive statistics gives us substantial
information into the relative importance of research on the various diseases as viewed
by the National Institutes of Health. What is missing is an understanding of the
motivation behind their decisions about the level of spending for research on each
disease, as well as the rate at which that spending is increased over the years.
3.5 Regression Results
Does the N.I.H. operate under a pure public interest theory of resource
allocation? In an attempt to explain the logic of the decisions made by the N.I.H., a
regression analysis was performed to determine whether the amount of research
funding allocated to various diseases at the National Institutes of Health depends on
the number of deaths from that disease. The dependent variable is real N.I.H. funding
o f research on that disease for each year from 1987 through 2001. Nominal dollar
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amounts have been converted to constant (1984) dollars using the annual Consumer
Price Index published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.1 The independent
variable is deaths from a disease in each year from 1979 through 1998, the latest year
for which final death statistics are available.

Death data were obtained from the

Centers for Disease Control WONDER Mortality Database (http://wonder.cdc.eovl.
Death statistics require two years for compilation and finalization, and budgets are
prepared almost a year in advance. Consequently, the latest death data available when
planning the 2001 fiscal year budget, for example, is the death data from 1998. It is
quite possible, however, that a longer lag time than three years is needed for death data
to be incorporated into research funding allocations. It may take a number of years for
changing death patterns to be evaluated and research directed toward specific disease
areas. It is therefore hypothesized that funding in any given year should respond to
deaths from that disease in earlier years. In order to test the public interest hypothesis
as fully as possible, various lags of the death data from three years to eight years prior
to the funding data will be used in the analysis.
Because the incremental budgeting model quite accurately describes the
budgeting process for the N.I.H., as well as other federal agencies, it is hypothesized
that budget increases for many diseases in many years are simply based on a
percentage o f the previous year’s budget. Because there is a consistent upward trend
to the amounts spent, a log-linear model was used.

'Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index [database on-line] (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, 2001), Internet Available from ftp://ftD.bls.gov/Dub/sDecial-reauests/cDi(accessed IS February 2001).
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3.5.1 Fifteen Year Pooled Data Regressions
Because the data contain both a cross-section of diseases and a time-series of
fifteen years, a model incorporating panel data was deemed appropriate. There are
twenty-one diseases tracked over the fifteen year period from 1987 through 2001, for a
total of 315 observations. The diseases are listed in Table 3.3. There are no missing
observations. The one-way fixed effects panel data model in Equation 1.1 is called

Model One. This model allows the initial level of funding for each disease to be
different, which is appropriate. However, the model assumes that the slopes are
constant across time and across diseases. The equation estimated in Model One can be
written as:
LNCFUNDS, =

+ £ SjDJt + A D R A T IO ,., + £ Y R + &DYR, +

(3.1)

£D Y RD TH it + &CDEM,., + # P D E M t., + elt

where
LNCFUNDSit = log of N.I.H. research funding for disease i in year t

DRATIOjt-3 = log of deaths from disease i in year t divided by total deaths in year t-3
P _ (1 if disease i = j
j‘ 10 otherwise
YR = time trend
n v „ _ f 1 if t > 1999
* ~ 10 otherwise
DYRDTH,, = DYR, * DRATIO,,

CDEM,., = I 1 if Democrats control the Congress in year t-1
0 otherwise
Democrats control the Presidency in year t-1
PDEM,, = {,01 if
otherwise
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The dependent variable is the log of N.I.H. research funding for disease i in
year t (LNCFUNDS). The independent variable measuring the burden of disease is the
death ratio (DRATIO), which is deaths from disease i in year t-3 (t-4, ...,t-8) divided
by the total deaths from all diseases in year t-3 (t-4...... t-8). The number of deaths
from each disease is scaled by the total deaths for that year to eliminate the effect of
increasing deaths over time due to population increases.

If the N.I.H. allocates

spending on the basis of the burden of disease, this variable should be positive.
A time trend variable, YR, was included to capture the incremental budgeting
effect. A dummy variable, DYR, was included for the years 1999-2001, because in
1998 Congress received the report on the N.I.H. they had commissioned from the
Institute of Medicine, and the Congress vowed to double the N.I.H. budget over the
next five years. Funding for many diseases took a major jump in 1999; however,
some individual members of Congress as well as the Institute of Medicine report
encouraged the N.I.H. to be more sensitive to the burden of disease when allocating
funds. We included an interaction variable, DYRDTH, to capture any change in the
relationship between funding and deaths after 1998.
Two political variables are included: CDEM and PDEM. These are timebased dummy variables which measure Democratic Party control of the Congress and
Presidency in the year the funding was determined (year t-1). The controlling party
for the House and Senate both was the Democrats from 1986-1994 and the
Republicans from 199S-2000. The President was a Republican from 1986 to 1992 and
a Democrat from 1993 to 2000. If Democrats are bigger spenders than Republicans,
then the effects of these Democratic party variables on funding will be positive.
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The results o f estimating Equation 3.1 (Model One) are shown in Table 3.4
under the heading “With Dummy Variables.” The model, which has an R2 of 0.9225,
explains a significant amount of the variation in LNCFUNDS. The model compares
the first nineteen diseases to the omitted disease, which is tuberculosis. Cancer (all
types combined) was omitted from this regression, so that breast cancer and prostate

Table 3.4
Model One Regression Results
15-Year Pooled Data
_______________
Dependent Variable - Log of Funding____________
With Dummy Variables
Without Dummy Variables
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Estimate
t-statistic
Alzheimer’s
2.4993
16.24*
2.5105
16.28*
Asthma
1.1084
8.08*
1.1110
8.06*
9.41*
Breast Cancer
2.4693
2.4977
9.52*
Chronic Fatigue
-1.6679
-12.24*
-1.6689
-12.18*
1.0001
Cystic Fibrosis
7.35*
1.0002
7.31*
Diabetes
2.7550
9.42*
2.7917
9.57*
Epstein-Barr
-0.0437
-0.32
-0.0447
-0.33
HIV/Aids
4.0043
22.64*
4.0182
22.68*
Hypertension
2.0703
14.39*
2.0772
14.39*
Kidney Disease
2.2381
11.27*
2.2576
11.37*
Lupus
0.4329
3.18*
0.4328
3.17*
Osteoporosis
1.4129
10.38*
1.4126
10.33*
Parkinson’s
1.2938
9.19*
1.2997
9.20*
Prostate Cancer
1.0357
4.90*
1.0568
5.00*
STD’s
1.5348
11.26*
1.5339
11.20*
Sickle Cell
0.8206
6.03*
0.8199
5.99*
Spinal Cord
0.9156
6.66*
0.9185
6.65*
Stroke
1.7077
2.14**
1.8090
2.27**
SIDS
0.7814
5.70*
0.7832
5.69*
Intercept
8.6366
54.98*
8.8985
84.96*
Yr
0.1006
6.88*
0.0778
15.50*
Dratio
-0.2619
-0.06
-0.5962
-0.14
Dyr
0.1130
-1.30
Dyrdth
1.2010
0.88
Cdem
0.1741
2.06**
Pdem
-0.0053
-0.06
Model R2
0.9224
0.9205
♦significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level.
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cancer could be included. A regression which included overall cancer and dropped
breast cancer and prostate cancer specifically produced very similar results. Of the
nineteen diseases then included, eighteen had intercepts that differed from the
tuberculosis intercept. Again, this is evidence that the N.I.H. does not consider some
diseases to be as deserving of research as other diseases, because the exogenous level
o f funding differs across diseases. Some diseases are more equal than others.
The death ratio was insignificant, which indicates that the N.I.H. is not altering
funding priorities over time as the death ratio changes. A joint F-test for DRATIO and
DYRDTH had a p-value o f 0.6726, so we could not reject the null hypothesis that they
were both equal to zero. One explanation for this seemingly unexpected lack of
significance of DRATIO might be that the data did not exhibit enough variation;
however, an examination of DRATIO for each disease over time revealed that this was
not a problem. Another possibility is that the effect of deaths is captured in the disease
dummy variable. We explore this possibility below.
The time trend variable was positive and significant, providing support for the
incremental budgeting theory. It appears that the initial distribution of funds across
diseases is largely maintained over time, with overall budget increases causing most
increases in individual disease funding. The coefficient o f DYR, the dummy variable
for the years 1999-2001, was not significant. The sudden increase in the N.I.H. budget
had less impact on funding than the time trend. The interaction term, DYRDTH, was
not significant, so the relationship between deaths and funding did not change after
1999. The join F-test for DYR and DYRDTH had a p-value of 0.3916, so once again
we could not reject the null hypothesis that they were both equal to zero.
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The political time-based dummy variable CDEM was positive and significant,
capturing the decline in funding which took place in 199S after the Republicans took
over Congress from the Democrats.

However, the change from a Republican

President to a Democratic one in 1993 did not significantly affect funding. Congress
may simply be more important than the President in making funding decisions for the
N.I.H.
Model One was re-estimated dropping the dummy variables DYR, DYRDTH,
CDEM, and PDEM. These results are also shown in Table 3.4, under the heading
“Without Dummy Variables.” The results are almost identical to those of the initial
regression. The R2 is 0.920S, and the same eighteen diseases have intercepts which
differ from that of tuberculosis, with approximately the same coefficients. Again, the
time trend variable, YR, is significant and positive, while the death ratio variable,
DRATIO, is not significant.
The values in Table 3.4 show us which diseases have an intercept that is
significantly different than that of the excluded disease, tuberculosis. While this is
useful information, we cannot judge from this the magnitude of the differences. We
can, however, determine the percentage change in funding for each disease over the
funding for tuberculosis for each of the diseases included in the model. These results
are shown in Table 3.S. The transformation is from Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980),
and is shown below:
Letlny = $ + $ x + < © + e , where D = | q
Then Iny, = (/?,+ <5) + /?2x, when D = 1, and lny0= /?, +• P2x^ when D = 0.
The percent change in y = e5 - 1 when D = 1 versus D = 0.
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We have computed the estimates for Model One without the dummy variables.
We can see from Table 3.5 that there is a significant percentage increase in the
funding for seventeen of the nineteen diseases. The largest of these is for HIV/Aids;
there is a fifty-five percent change in exogenous funding for HIV/Aids. Diabetes
received about sixteen percent more funding, while breast cancer experienced an
increase in exogenous funding of slightly more than eleven percent. These percentage
shifts in funding represent the higher priority given to those diseases by the N.I.H.
Only one disease has a significant decrease in the funding: chronic fatigue syndrome.
For two diseases, Epstein-Barr disease and stroke, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no change in the exogenous level of funding relative to tuberculosis.

Table 3.5
Model One Estimation Results
Fifteen Year Pooled Data
_________________ Estimation of Percentage Change in Funding___________
Variable
Estimate (Percent)
t-statistic
Alzheimer’s
11.31
5.96*
Asthma
2.04
4.87*
Breast Cancer
11.15
3.50*
Chronic Fatigue
-0.81
-31.44*
Cystic Fibrosis
1.72
4.62*
Diabetes
15.31
3.22*
Epstein-Barr
-0.04
-0.33
HIV/Aids
54.60
5.54*
Hypertension
6.98
6.06*
Kidney Disease
8.56
4.51*
Lupus
0.54
2.57**
Osteoporosis
3.11
5.53*
Parkinson’s
2.67
5.15*
Prostate Cancer
1.88
3.09*
STD’s
3.64
5.73*
Sickle Cell
1.27
4.09*
Spinal Cord
1.51
4.35*
Stroke
5.10
1.05
SIDS
1.19
3.94*
•significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
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While the fixed-effects Model One provides support for the incremental theory
of governmental budgeting, and confirms that funding varies significantly across
diseases even after controlling for deaths, it does not provide an explanation for the
initial allocation across disease at the beginning of the period. In an attempt to explain
these initial distributions, we compared the 1987 research funding for each disease to
the 1979 death ratio of that disease. Death data for 1979 is the earliest available from
the CDC WONDER Mortality Database. The following equation was estimated:
LNFUNDSit = fi\ + /feLNDEATHSu + eit

(3.2)

where
LNFUNDSit

= Log of research funding for disease i in 1987

LNDEATHSu = Log of deaths from disease i in 1979
The results of the estimation, Model Two, are shown in Table 3.6. The model
has an R2 of 0.428S. There is a significant, positive relationship between research
funding and deaths for each disease.

The coefficients represent the elasticity of

funding with respect to deaths; an increase in deaths from a disease of one percent
causes an increase in funding of 0.38 percent We tested the model specification
following Ramsey (1969,1974) and could not reject the hypothesis that no significant
variables were omitted from the model.

Table 3.6
Model Two
Fifteen Year Pooled Data
_______________Dependent Variable = Log of Funding_______________
K1 0.4285
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Intercept
7.5762
9.08*
Lndeaths
0.3807
3.77*
♦significant at the 0.01 level
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The level of deaths from each disease apparently mattered when the N.I.H.
made initial funding decisions, which means that the N.I.H. is concerned with the
public interest. Once the relative level of funding has been established, the N.I.H.
seems to follow an incremental budgeting pattern. Another examination of the fifteen
year data set was conducted to verify these conclusions. A regression was run using
the 1979 death ratios and a time trend to explain the funding for all years from 19872001 and using ordinary least squares. These results were verified using a random

coefficients model. The results of this estimation, Model Three, are shown in Table
3.7. The equation estimated was as follows:
LNFUNDSit = yft + /ftDRATIOj + /?3YR + /?4DRATYR, + eit (3.3)

where
LNFUNDSit = Log of funding for disease i in

year t

DRATIOi

= Deaths from disease iin 1979 divided by total deaths in 1979

YR

= Time trend

DRATYRi

= DRATIOi'YR

Table 3.7
Model Three
Fifteen Year Pooled Data
_______________ Dependent Variable - Log of Funding_______________
R4 0.4668
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Intercept
10.6787
48.54*
Dratio
0.0553
13.93*
Yr
5.6126
2.30**
Dratyr
0.0081
0.18
•significant at the 0.01 level.
The model has an R2 of 0.4668. The coefficients of both the death ratio
(DRATIO) and the time trend (YR) are significant and positive. The interaction term,
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DRATYR, was not significant. These results support our earlier contention that the
N.I.H. allocates funding in accordance with the burden of diseases, and budgets using
an incremental budgeting model. The regression was also run including the political
dummy variables DYR, CDEM, and PDEM; however, these were never significant
and did not add to the explanatory power of the model.

3.5.2 Ten Year Pooled Data Regressions
Data were collected on a broader cross-section of twenty-seven diseases for the
ten year period 1992-2001, for a total of 270 observations. The additional diseases
include some of the major killers in the United States:

heart disease,

pneumonia/influenza, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), liver disease,
and lung cancer. Schizophrenia is also included. Table 3.8 gives the dataset funding
as a percent of the N.I.H. total budget for the years 1992-2001, and Table 3.9
compares dataset deaths to total deaths for the years 1989-1998. The percentage of
funding covered by this study is always at least sixty percent of total N.I.H. funding,
while the fraction of total deaths contained in the death dataset is about two-thirds.

Table 3.8
Research Funding Data
(In Thousands of Nominal Dollars)
N.I.H.
Year
Data Set
Percent
Total
Total
1992
$10,010,368
$ 6,138,923
0.6133
10,328,117
1993
6,498,086
0.6292
10,910,969
1994
7,072,782
0.6482
11,340,841
1995
7,444,928
0.6565
11,880,847
1996
7,941,119
0.6684
12,770,771
1997
8,397,660
0.6576
13,622,386
1998
8,776,865
0.6443
15,597,189
1999
10,453,800
0.6702
17,793,587
11,785,300
2000
0.6623
20,300,000
2001
12,299,500
0.6059
Source: Office o1: Communications ant Public Liaison, N.I.H. Almanac, 1999.
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Table 3.9
Death Data
Year
Total
Data Set
Percent
Deaths
Deaths
1989
2,150,466
1,412,539
0.6569
1990
2,148,463
1,412,761
0.6577
1991
2,169,518
1,425,941
0.6573
1992
2,175,613
1,431,841
0.6581
1993
2,268,553
1,497,628
0.6602
1994
2,278,994
1,499,735
0.6581
1995
2,312,132
1,521,695
0.6581
1996
2,314,690
1,516,580
0.6552
1997
2,314,245
1,505,035
0.6503
1998
1,513,487
2,337,258
0.6475
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics, Annual.
Cardiovascular disease is the number one cause of death in the United States
and has been for the second half of the twentieth century. COPD ranks consistently
fourth or fifth, while pneumonia/influenza is generally sixth (see Appendix A). Liver
disease was the tenth leading cause of death from 1994-1998, and was the ninth
leading cause of death for 1984-1990. Even though these diseases accounted for a
substantial number of deaths, the N.I.H. does not have statistics on the funding for
research on these diseases before 1992. Failure to collect this data was one of the
shortcomings cited in the Congressionally-mandated review o f the N.I.H. ordered in
1996. This study is the first to examine the relationship between these devastating
diseases and the amount of N.I.H. research funding directed toward them.
A pooled time-series cross-section regression was used to estimate Equation
3.4. As with the fifteen year data set, the regressions were run in a one-way fixed
effects format (the intercept varies only by disease). The regressions were run using
both total cancer (all sites) funding and deaths, and the separate numbers for breast
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cancer, prostate cancer, and lung cancer. There was no significant difference in the
results. Also, the model was estimated with and without the dummy variables.
The equation estimated was as follows:
.V -I

LNCFUNDS,, = # + £ SjDjt + $ DRATIO it_3+ £ Y R +>9, DYR, +

(3.4)

7-1

$ DYRDTH jt + &CDEM,., + /^PDEM,., + eit

The variables have interpretations identical to those in Equation 3.1. The model was
estimated both with and without the dummy variables. The results of this regression,

Model Four, are shown in Table 3.10.
For ease of comparison with the results of the fifteen-year study, the omitted
disease is again tuberculosis.

Of the twenty-five diseases included, the intercept

varied significantly from that of tuberculosis for nineteen of the diseases in the model
estimated with dummy variables. The exogenous level of funding for sixteen of these
diseases is greater than that for tuberculosis, afier controlling for the number of
deaths from each disease.

Conversely, cardiovascular disease,

COPD and

pneumonia/influenza (three of the deadliest diseases) had intercepts that did not vary
statistically from that of tuberculosis. We cannot conclude that these diseases received
higher exogenous levels of funding than tuberculosis. Chronic fatigue, Epstein-Barr,
and lupus had intercepts that were significantly lower than that of tuberculosis.
As in the fifteen year data results, the time trend was highly significant, again
lending support to the incremental budgeting theory. The measure of deaths from
each disease, DRATIO, was not significantly different from zero.

This lack of

significance was not due to any lack of variation in the death ratio data during this
time. The joint F-test o f the hypothesis that both DRATIO and DYRDTH were equal
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Table 3.10
Model Four Regression Results
Ten Year Pooled Data
Dependent Variable = Log ol Funding
With Dummy Variables
Without Dummy Variables
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Estimate
t-statistic
Alzheimer’s
1.8360
20.65*
1.8418
21.34*
0.4942
6.29*
6.34*
Asthma
0.4955
2.0042
14.80*
2.0191
Breast Cancer
16.22*
1.73
Cardiovascular
3.3323
3.5906
2.12**
-2.2042
-28.26*
-2.2047
Chronic Fatigue
-28.35*
Cystic Fibrosis
0.1888
2.42**
0.1884
2.42**
1.8837
11.64*
Diabetes
1.9028
2.97*
Epstein-Barr
-0.9128
-11.94*
-11.70*
-0.9133
30.94*
HIV/Aids
3.3099
3.3196
32.85*
Hypertension
1.1772
14.33*
1.1808
14.58*
1.3837
13.01*
Kidney Disease
1.3935
13.89*
-0.4289
Lupus
-5.51*
-0.4290
-5.52*
0.7117
Osteoporosis
9.16*
9.14*
0.7115
Parkinson’s
0.5486
6.79*
6.90*
0.5515
0.6717
5.85*
6.36*
Prostate Cancer
0.6830
-0.7222
STD’s
9.26*
0.7217
9.28*
-0.0715
-0.92
Sickle Cell
-0.0719
-0.92
0.0222
0.28
Spinal Cord
0.0236
0.30
1.0084
Stroke
2.61*
3.10*
1.0593
-0.1335
-1.71
SIDS
-0.1326
-1.70
COPD
0.0046
0.02
0.0367
0.16
Liver Disease
1.1560
10.82*
1.1659
11.57*
Lung Cancer
0.9540
2.42**
1.0059
2.89*
Pneumonia/Influenza
0.1368
0.60
0.1654
0.82
Schizophrenia
0.9379
12.03*
0.9375
12.06*
Intercept
10.1988
125.66*
172.67*
10.1512
Dratio
-0.7688
-0.20
-1.2680
-0.37
Yr
0.0467
3.06*
0.0555
14.79*
Dyr
0.0626
1.14
Dyrdth
0.0804
0.28
Cdem
0.0153
0.31
Pdem
0.0277
0.60
’ significant at the 0.01 level, ’ ’ significant at the 0.0S level.
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

to zero had a p-value o f 0.4548. This is the same result as that which occurred in the
fifteen year study, and supports the theory that incremental budgeting dominates once
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the initial levels of funding are allocated. Changes in the death share after the initial
year do not appear to alter funding allocations. Cardiovascular disease alone kills over
800,000 people a year in the United States. Including these additional diseases gives a
clearer picture of the relationship between N.I.H. research funding and deaths from a
disease during the last decade.
As expected, the time trend variable is positive and highly significant,
supporting the incremental budgeting theory.

DYR, corresponding to the

Congressional decision to double N.I.H. funding in five years (1999-2003), was not
significant in this regression (or in the earlier one). Instead, the time trend accounts for
essentially all of the increase in funding. Again, the interaction variable, DYRDTH,
was not significant, indicating that the slope of the relationship between DRATIO and
LNCFUNDS did not change in 1999. These results were confirmed by a join F-test of
the significance of DYR and DYRDTH, which had a p-value of 0.8972.
Neither of the political variables, CDEM or PDEM, was significant The
change from a Democratically-controlled Congress to a Republican Congress (CDEM)
did not materially affect funding; this is a different result than the one obtained in the
fifteen year panel data regression. The difference between the results in the ten and
fifteen year regressions may be due to the differences in the diseases in the two
datasets. The ten year dataset contains all of the top ten disease causes of death; this is
more than twice as many deaths as that contained in the fifteen year data.

The

amount of funding for these major killer diseases may not fluctuate as much with
political changes as funding for those diseases that kill fewer people. It is logical for
Congress to fund research on those diseases which impact the lives of many voters.
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Another explanation for the difference in the results may be the reduced variation in
funding over the ten year period as compared to the fifteen year period.
As in the fifteen year analysis, we are interested in the magnitude of the
intercept changes across diseases. Table 3.9 shows the percentage change in funding
by disease. O f the twenty-five diseases included in the regression, seventeen had
percentage changes in funding that were significant relative to the funding for
tuberculosis. The largest was HIV/Aids, whose exogenous level of funding was 26.65

Table 3.11
Model Four Estimation Results
Ten Year Pooled Data
Estimate
t-statistic
Variable
5.31
Alzheimer’s
9.75*
0.64
Asthma
5.00*
6.53
6.97*
Breast Cancer
35.25
0.57
Cardiovascular
-0.89
Chronic Fatigue
-103.73*
0.21
Cystic Fibrosis
2.21**
5.70
Diabetes
5.80*
-0.60
Epstein-Barr
-19.19*
26.65
HIV/Aids
9.54*
2.26
Hypertension
8.56*
3.03
Kidney Disease
7.49*
-0.35
Lupus
-6.89*
1.04
Osteoporosis
6.55*
0.74
Parkinson’s
5.30*
0.98
Prostate Cancer
4.61*
1.06
STD’s
6.61*
-0.07
Sickle Cell
-0.96
Spinal Cord
0.02
0.30
1.88
Stroke
1.91
-0.12
SIDS
-1.82
0.04
COPD
0.16
2.21
Liver Disease
6.83*
1.73
Lung Cancer
1.82
Pneumonia/Influenza
0.18
0.75
1.55
Schizophenia
7.83*
‘significant at the 0.01 level, ‘ ‘ significant at the 0.05 level
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percent higher than that o f the omitted disease, tuberculosis. Other diseases with large
funding increases were breast cancer

(6.53 percent), Alzheimer’s disease (5.31

percent), and diabetes (5.70 percent).

Three diseases had significant percentage

decreases in funding: chronic fatigue (-0.89 percent), Epstein-Barr (-0.60 percent),
lupus (-0.35 percent).

For four of the deadliest diseases, cardiovascular disease,

stroke, COPD, and pneumonia/influenza, we cannot reject the hypothesis that their
funding did not differ significantly from that of tuberculosis.

3.53 Separate Regressions
In addition to the panel data regressions, separate time-series regressions were
run for each o f the twenty-one diseases. The graphs of funding by disease presented
earlier clearly showed that the slopes of the funding curves were not the same for all
diseases.

The fixed-effect models’ assumption that this condition is true is not

realistic. There is a trade-off between the loss of information which can only be
obtained from the use of pooled data, and the gain from a more accurate assumption
about the rate of change in funding for various diseases over time. As in the earlier
models, the dependent variable in each equation is the log of constant dollar funding
by the N.I.H. on that disease (LNCFUNDS), and the independent variable is the log of
deaths from that disease lagged three years (LNDEATH).

The equation estimated

was:
LNCFUNDS, = # + &LNDEATHtJ + e,

(3.6)

The results of these twenty-one individual time-series regressions are
summarized in Table 3.12. The intercept term was significant for fifteen of the
twenty-one diseases, showing that the exogenous levels o f funding set in 1987 were a
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Table 3.12
Fifteen Year Separate Regression Results
Dependent Variable - Log of Funding
Disease
Intercept
Lndeath
Alzheimer’s
1.5854
1.0922*
Asthma
-19.0297*
3.4975*
Breast Cancer
-161.9915*
16.3233*
All Cancer
-13.9017**
2.1479*
Chronic Fatigue
7.9273*
-0.0614
Cystic Fibrosis
10.2866**
0.0388
Diabetes
6.9691*
0.4920**
Epstein Barr
8.3359*
0.4042
HIV/Aids
8.7674*
0.4834*
Hypertension
10.0462*
0.1676**
Kidney
-2.5684
1.3992*
Lupus
-4.1256
1.9704*
Osteoporosis
3.8423*
1.0697*
Parkinson’s
1.2529*
1.0648*
Prostate Cancer
-62.3313*
7.0450*
STD’s
14.5634*
-0.7635*
Sickle Cell
8.4470*
0.3104**
Spinal Cord
2.1843
0.9634*
Stroke
-28.6664
3.3570
SIDS
11.0399*
-0.0879
Tuberculosis
43.9438**
-4.6744**
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
prime determinant of later funding.

The models are in Iog-log form, so the

coefficients on LNDEATH represent the elasticity of disease research funding with
respect to deaths from that disease. For the following diseases, a change in deaths was
not a significant predictor of a change in research funding: chronic fatigue, cystic
fibrosis, Epstein-Barr syndrome, hypertension, stroke, and sudden infant death
syndrome. O f these diseases, stroke was consistently the third cause of death from
1984-1998. Chronic fatigue syndrome and Epstein-Barr syndrome almost never kill
anyone, so it is not surprising that funding for these diseases is not related to deaths.
Even hypertension (by itself), cystic fibrosis, and sudden infant death syndrome cause
a relatively low number o f deaths. Two diseases had elasticities that were negative
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and significant: sexually transmitted diseases and tuberculosis. These diseases had
increases even though the number of deaths from them was either declining or flat,
indicating that the N.I.H. is considering other factors when allocating funding for these
diseases, such as the fact that both of these diseases are communicable.
Those diseases for which the elasticity of funding with respect to deaths was
positive and significant were Alzheimer’s, asthma, breast cancer, cancer (all types),
HIV/Aids, hypertension, kidney disease, lupus, osteoporosis, Parkinson’s disease,
prostate cancer, sickle cell disease, and spinal cord injury. Of these diseases, only
cancer and diabetes were in the top ten causes of death for all fifteen years; Aids was
in the top ten causes for seven of those fifteen years. All of the estimates were
positive, and ranged from a low of 1.0648 for Parkinson’s disease to a high of 16.3233
for breast cancer.

Only asthma, breast cancer, and prostate cancer had elasticity

estimates greater than three. An increase in deaths for any of these three diseases
generated increases in research funding that were disproportionately large.

An

increase in breast cancer deaths of one percent, for example, caused a 16.59 percent
increase in research funding for breast cancer.
It should be kept in mind that because there are only fifteen observations for
each disease, the statistical reliability of these estimates is not strong. Because of the
low degrees of freedom, the time dummy variables were not included in these models.

3.6 Conclusions
The public interest theory of biomedical research hypothesizes that policy
makers should allocate research funds in such a way as to provide the maximum
benefit to all o f the citizens of the nation. A logical interpretation would be to
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evaluate whether the N.I.H. is distributing research dollars in accordance with the
distribution of the burden o f disease.

This chapter evaluated specifically the

relationship between disease research funding allocations from 1987-2001 and one
measure of the burden of disease, total deaths from each disease. Another important
theory we tested is whether or not the N.I.H. follows an incremental budgeting model.
We also included variables to assess the impact of political changes on the funding
process.
For the both fifteen year and ten year panel datasets, our results showed that
changes in the burden of disease measure (DRATIO) once the initial allocations had
been made did not significantly affect the distribution of research funding across
diseases. The burden of disease did impact the initial allocation of funds; however,
after that, the process of incremental budgeting explains increases in funding. The
time trend variable, YR, was always positive and highly significant.
The political variables PDEM and DYR, capturing the effect of the election of
a Democratic President and the 1998 Congressional decision to double the N.I.H.
overall budget, had no impact on funding in the fifteen year dataset regression
estimation. These results were substantiated by our examination o f the larger ten-year
panel data set. However, we did not get consistent results when measuring the effect
of the change from a Democratically-controlled Congress to a Republican Congress
(CDEM). CDEM was significant and positive in the fifteen year dataset regression;
the level of funding decreased after 199S. This result was not confirmed by the
estimation of the ten year dataset regression; CDEM was positive, but not significant.
We cannot conclude, then, that political factors do not affect N.I.H. funding.
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For both the fifteen and ten year panel data sets, alternative specifications of
the model were used to test for robustness. Using either a four year or five year lag
between deaths and funding decisions did not alter the results. Including a lag of
funding as an explanatory variable provided strong support for the incremental
budgeting theory, but did not provide any illumination about the allocation among the
various diseases, which was what we were seeking.

Finally, the use of first

differencing and shift-share formats for the models was tried and rejected, as the fit
with the data was not good.
The separate evaluations of twenty different diseases over the period 19872001 found a significant positive correlation between deaths and funding over time for
most diseases; however, the sample size did not permit the inclusion of time trend or
political variables.
In subsequent sections, this dissertation will attempt to explain these
differences across diseases using both political and special interest group variables.
Additional data on more diseases will be included.
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CHAPTER 4
CROSS SECTIONAL DATA AND REGRESSIONS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the allocation of N.I.H. research funding across diseases
for the most recent year data is available. This cross-sectional data enables us to
consider a larger number of diseases, alternative measures of the burden of diseases,
and the effects of politics and special interest group influence that were not possible
wit the pooled data. The number of diseases included was expanded to forty-two.
N.I.H. research funding levels for this analysis were for the year 1999, and death data
was consequently that for 1996, the latest year available when funding decisions were
made in 1998. The diseases, the number of deaths, the years of life lost (YLL), and
the amount of funding for research are shown in Table 4.1.

Funding data were

obtained from the N.I.H. web page (http://www.N.I.H..gov) and from correspondence
with N.I.H. employees. Death data was obtained from the Centers for Disease Control
web page (http://www.cdc.govl using the CDC Wonder Mortality Database search
tool. Deaths are classified using the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision.
Table 4.1
Cross Section Data
Deaths*
YLL**
Disease
Discharges*
Funds***
21,397
Alzheimer’s
171,206.1
16,000
S 406,500
124,430.4
5,665
Asthma
474,000
140,400
43,447
760,035.6
Breast Cancer
123,000
474,700
539,508
8,222,523.5
Cancer
1,805,000
3,377,300
8,691,801.4
Cardiovascular
733,262
4,229.000
1,327,100
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selectee Categories. Centers for Disease Control,
WONDER Mortality Database. *1996 figures. **years of life lost 1996. ***in
thousands of nominal dollars.
(Table 4.1 continued)
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Variable
Deaths*
YLL**
Discharges* Funds***
Chronic Fatigue
4
26.7
N/A
6,700
430
Cystic Fibrosis
22,409.6
14,000
71,600
61,766
Diabetes
457,600
876,685.1
503,000
16
27,100
Epstein Barr
864.7
9,000
HIV/Aids
31,123
1,187,247.4
101,000
1,792,700
12,945
Hypertension
175,400
147,655.3
284,000
30,586
Kidney Disease
376,768.4
485,000
247,900
1,404
Lupus
46,100
38,467.3
23,000
1,172
Osteoporosis
136,700
9,853.3
175,000
Parkinson’s
11,845
132,300
103,995.1
20,000
Prostate Cancer
34,122
90,000
177,500
355,490.5
101
136,400
STD’s
N/A
2,330.2
507
Sickle Cell
50,400
21,835.1
56,000
Spinal Cord
5,821
62,100
229,229.1
72,000
153,041
186,000
Stroke
955,000
1,584,088.5
sm s
3,050
49,300
232,105.0
N/A
Tuberculosis
1,202
72,800
21,567.5
7,000
98,647
COPD
80,000
1,124,605.6
137,000
185,637
Liver Disease
28,881
637,909.1
112,000
152,007
Lung Cancer
2,290,162.4
180,000
163,000
73,000
895,418.1
1,223,000
Pneumonia/Influenza 83,717
420
Schizophrenia
5,454.6
257,000
200,600
ALS
4,159
68,342.3
N/A
17,200
Arthritis
2,908
32,345.4
238,800
449,000
Autism
2
76.5
N/A
40,000
Ovarian Cancer
13,342
209,865.5
31,000
65,400
Fibromyalgia
42
645.4
9,000
6,400
2,577
Hepatitis C
57,843.9
7,000
39,700
4
Malaria
136.8
N/A
25,300
2,291
51,923.4
Multiple Sclerosis
20,000
96,300
996
Muscular Dystrophy
35,191.3
6,000
16,700
3,594
Nutritional Problems
32,526.0
15,000
587,500
Obesity
2,097
53,114.2
16,000
161,400
Cervical Cancer
4,513
107,530.7
N/A
75,200
Colorectal Cancer
56,515
765,016.8
155,000
175,900
Epilepsy
1,413
46,883.1
N/A
81,700
23,707
Septicemia
452,289.2
355,000
16,500
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control,
WONDER Mortality Database. *1996 figures. **years of life lost 1996. ***in
thousands of nominal dollars.
Examination of this broader collection of diseases reveals the same variation
across diseases in the levels o f funding per death from a disease. Figure 4.1 shows the
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Figure 4.1: Log of Total Deaths (1996) and Funding Per Death by Disease (1999). Source: Office of Communications
and Public Liaison, Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control, WONDER Mortality Database.
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log of 1999 funding per death for seventeen of the forty-two diseases and the log of
the number of deaths from that disease in 1996. The top ten causes of death are
included, as are the five diseases that caused the fewest deaths in the dataset. If
funding is proportional to deaths, then the ratio should be the same for all diseases. As
the graph shows, the ratio fluctuates quite a lot. Also, there is something of an inverse
relationship depicted:

the funding per death increases as the number of deaths

declines.
Because the analysis only covers 1999, it was possible to gather other
explanatory variables in addition to the number of deaths as a measure of the burden
of disease. It was also possible to create variables to measure the effect of special
interest group influence and public interest. The National Institutes of Health has an
obligation to act in the pubic interest. Ways in which they might do this include such
things as reducing the burden o f disease on our society and preventing the spread of
contagious diseases. There are several possible methods of determining the burden of
disease to society, such as the number of deaths from a disease, the incidence of
disease, the cost of treatment, the severity of the disease, or lost work time and income
foregone to a disease. Burden of disease measures are used to quantify the impact of
various diseases on our society.
Total deaths as a measure o f the burden of disease have the property that all
deaths are equal in their undesirability. The death of one person from any disease is
no more important to society than the death of any other person from any other
disease.

This measure ignores such factors as the age, sex, race, income, or

contribution to society o f a person when determining the effect of his death on society

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83
as a whole. Using total deaths, then, would mean that the death of a white child was
not more important than the death of a black child; the death of an infant was no worse
than the death of an eighty-year-old man; the death of the President of the United
States was no more devastating than the death of an unemployed woman; and the
death of Albert Schweitzer was no different than the death of Adolf Hitler. The
complete impartiality of this measure is both an advantage and a disadvantage. If a
society values equality and abhors discrimination, it is a suitable ethical measure of
the impact of deaths. It is expected that the N.I.H. would spend more money on
research for diseases that kill the most people, so this variable should have a positive
impact on research funding allocated to a disease.
However, in a purely economic sense, total deaths from a disease may not be
the best measure of the burden of that disease to society. Economically speaking, all
deaths are not equal. The death of a forty-year-old man is more costly than the death
of an eighty-year-old man, because the death of the younger man deprives society of
his labor and productivity for a larger number of years. This reduces national income
below what it would have been had the man not died. Deaths at earlier ages, then,
impose larger costs to society than deaths at later ages. A measure of the burden of
disease which takes the age at death into account is the years of life lost to a disease.
The total years of life lost (YLL) to a disease is thus weighted by both age of deaths
and number of deaths. The years of life lost to each disease in 1996 is also presented
in Table 4.1.
Note that this measure is not based on productivity of each individual as is the
Disability Adjusted Life Year. The weighting scheme in that construction puts a zero
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value on infants (who earn no income), rises over time to age 27, and falls thereafter,
approaching zero again at very high ages.1 The ethical implications of such a
construction are staggering.

If infants receive zero weight, why not unemployed

people, disabled people, prisoners? Years of life lost does not create these ethical
dilemma, and is less offensive to our sense of fairness. Distinctions based on age do
not create discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or socio-economic status.
Within a given age group, all people are treated equally. However, there is no denying
that this measure discriminates against older people and heavily favors children. This
may be perceived as acceptable discrimination, given that society recognizes the finite
nature of life and the inevitability of death at some age. Distributing research dollars
among diseases on the basis of years of life lost may be acceptable to society as a
whole, but it probably doesn't please older people, who are highly participatory voters.
If the N.I.H. attaches more value to the deaths of younger people than to deaths of
older people, we would expect the effect of years of life lost on funding to be positive.
Another useful indicator of the burden of disease is provided by the National
Hospital Discharge Survey. When patients are discharged from a hospital, the reason
for their visit, called a diagnosis code, is recorded by hospital staff. In this survey, the
first-listed diagnosis code on the patient's discharge from a hospital is used to
construct the number of hospital discharges (Discharges) each year attributable to each
disease. This information, also shown in Table 4.1, was available for thirty-four of the
forty-two diseases in the study. Inpatient hospitalization is a proxy for both the
severity of a disease and the cost of treatment, because hospitalization is reserved for

‘C.J.L Murray, “Quantifying the Burden of disease: The Technical Basis for Disability-Adjusted Life
Years," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 1994,72(3):435-436.
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very sick people and it is very expensive. Data from the 1996 survey is used in the
analysis, because that is the data that would have been available at the time of the
initial 1999 budget formulation. We predict that this measure should have a positive
impact, if the N.I.H. spends more money on those diseases that make people sickest or
require the costliest treatment.
The N.I.H. has a duty to act in the best interest o f the public. Another way in
which the N.I.H. could perform a public health function is to act to prevent the spread
o f communicable diseases. Consequently, we might expect to observe that the N.I.H.
allocates more research dollars to those diseases which can be transmitted from one
person to another. A dummy variable was constructed to indicate whether or not a
particular disease was contagious. It is expected that this variable will have a positive
coefficient in a regression estimation if prevention of contagion is a consideration of
the N.I.H. in making budgetary decisions.
The effect of special interest groups on the research dollar allocation process is
measured by constructing several lobbying variables. Special interest group theory
argues that organized groups with something to gain from federal regulation will
spend money to exert influence with congressmen. Congressmen can reward these
special interest group contributors with favorable legislation, and the cost of this
legislation is passed on to the millions of taxpayers.

This is the principal of

concentrated benefits and diversified costs. Data on the existence of a registered
lobbyist for a particular disease and the amount of lobbying dollars spent were
collected from the Center for Responsive Politics.2 A tiered variable was designed.

2 Center for Responsive Politics, “Influence Inc.: Lobbyists’ Spending in Washington,” Internet
Available from http://www.ooensecrets.org/lobbv/ (accessed 2 March 2001).
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The first dummy variable, LOB, took the value of 1 if there was a registered lobbyist
for a disease advocacy group and spending was less than $100,000 during the 19971998 election cycle. The dummy variables LOB1 measured the impact of lobbying
dollars spent in 1997 and 1998 greater than $100,000 but less than $200,000. The
dummy variable LOB2 measured the effect of spending more than $200,000 during
1997-1998. It is predicted that these lobbying expenditures will have a positive effect
on research spending for that disease.

4.2 Regression Analysis Using Death Data
The initial regression model for this cross sectional analysis, Model One, was
LNFUNDS,, = # + £LNDEATHSit.3 + £LO B t.,+ &LOB1,.,
+£LOB2,_, + flsCOMM+ei

(4 la )

where
LNFUNDSit

= Funding in 1999 for disease i

LNDEATHSu-3

= Deaths in 1996 from disease i

r hr

= fl disease advocacy group has a registered lobbyist and spent < $ 100,000
[0 otherwise

r hr i

t

(1 if lobbying dollars > $100,000 but < $200,000
(0 otherwise

nR?

=

‘•i

i * if lobbying dollars > $200,000
(0 otherwise

r n u u _ (1 if the disease is communicable
COMM - (ootherwise
The results from this regression are shown in Table 4.2. The log-log
specification was chosen over the linear model based on the Box-Cox likelihood
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estimator test of the relative sizes of the sum of squared errors.3 The model has an R2
of 0.5721, and the F-statistic for overall significance of the model is 9.62.

Table 4.2
Cross Section Model One
Using Deaths as Explanatory Variable
_________________Dependent Variable = Log of Funding_________________
F-Value
9.62
R2
0.5721
Variable
t-statistic
Estimate
Intercept
20.14*
9.1447
Lndeaths
0.2264
4.28*
Lob
0.4029
0.95
Lobl
1.28
0.6728
Lob2
3.37*
1.2466
Comm
0.97
0.4453
*significant at the 0.01 level
The coefficient of LNDEATHS is positive and significant, which is what we
expected. An increase of one percent in deaths from a disease causes an increase in
funding of 0.2264 percent.

The LOB and LOB1 variables were insignificant,

indicating that very low levels of lobbying expenditures did not have an impact.
However, LOB2 was positive and significant, indicating that special interest group
influence was effective in increasing funding.

Because the amounts of lobbying

dollars included in this variable range from $200,000 to $1 million, it is difficult to
place an exact numerical impact on the effect of lobbying. However, it is certainly fair
to say that those diseases which spend large amounts of money lobbying Congress
apparently get increased research funds. This result substantiates the special interest
group theory approach to regulation, which is not unexpected.

3 William E. Griffiths, R. Carter Hill, and George G. Judge, Learning and Practicing Econometrics,
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993), 345-346.
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The public interest group variable COMM, on the other hand, does not have
the expected result. The COMM variable, which signifies a contagious disease, does
not appear to be an important element in the distribution of research dollars.

Its

coefficient is not significant. Another interesting point is that the intercept term is
large and highly significant.

While the intercept term captures the effect of any

omitted variables, it also represents the exogenous level of funding allocation to a
disease by the N.I.H. The incremental theory of budgetary management discussed in
the previous section tells us that the initial decisions about funding levels made by the
N.I.H. are likely to be maintained over the years.
4.2.1 Regression Analysis Using Grouped Death Data
Model One postulates a linear relationship between funding and deaths, and
one overall intercept term (exogenous funding level) that is the same for all diseases.
The study of the panel data in Chapter 3, however, provided substantial evidence that
the intercept term is not the same for all diseases and that the relationship between
funding and deaths may not be linear. Consequently, we also estimated a step-wise
function, which divided the data into groups based on the number of deaths, allowing
the relationship between funding and deaths to be different for varying levels of
deaths. The equation estimated was:
LNFUNDS,, = /?, + &DEATH2,., + /?3DEATH3t., + &DEATH4,.,
(4. lb)
+ /?sDEATH5t . 3 + p bLOB,., + /?7LOB 1,., + ALOB2,., + #CO M M + e,
where
LNFUNDSit

= Log of funding for disease i in 1999

DEATH2t.3

= Diseases causing between 2,000 and 9,999 deaths in 1996

DEATH3t-3

= Diseases causing between 10,000 and 34,999 deaths in 1996
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DEATH4,.3

= Diseases causing between 35,000 and 99,999 deaths in 1996

DEATH5t.3

= Diseases causing at least 100,000 deaths in 1996

And LOB, LOB1, LOB2, and COMM have interpretations identical to those in
Equation 1.1. The omitted (reference) group is diseases which killed less than 2,000
people in 1996.
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 4.3. This estimation gives a
clearer and more intuitively-pleasing picture of the relationship between funding and
deaths. The coefficient of DEATH2 is not significant, indicating that the number of
deaths is not the motivator of funding for diseases which kill relatively few people.

Table 43
Death Groups Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding
K1
0.5640
F-statistic 5.34
Variable
Estimate
Intercept
10.2033
Death2
0.5047
Death3
1.1238
Death4
1.2381
Death5
2.0689
Lob
0.6408
Lobl
0.5401
Lob2
1.3924
Comm
0.6779
’ significant at the 0.01 leve .

t-statistic
32.82*
1.20
2.61*
2.34*
3.43*
1.37
0.97
3.63*
1.39

The coefficients of DEATH3, DEATH4, and DEATH5 are all positive and
significant; what is equally informative is that the coefficients become larger as the
number of deaths increases. This makes sense. The coefficient o f DEATHS is almost
twice as large as the coefficient of DEATH3. These results tell us, then, that the
relationship between funding for a disease and deaths from that disease becomes
stronger as the number of deaths increases.
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The special interest group variables have the same signs and significances as
they did in the previous regression. That is, neither LOB nor LOB I was significant;
but LOB2 had a coefficient that was positive and significant, supporting the theory
that large amounts of lobbying dollars do alter funding outcomes. As before, the
communicable disease variable, COMM, is not significant. This is puzzling.
4.2.2 Regression Analysis Using Legislative Variables
The analysis of the forces driving the allocation of research funding was
expanded to include more specific Congressional influence variables based on
information taken from the Congressional Record. Legislators of the 105th Congress
(1997-1998) enacted the appropriations bills for the N.I.H. and its component
institutes for fiscal year 1999.

An examination of the index of bills introduced and

those that became law gives us some indication of the direction which Congress
wishes the N.I.H. to take in research.
Consequently, the Congressional Record for the 105th Congress was searched
for all bills pertaining to the N.I.H. in general, any institutes or offices of the N.I.H.,
and all forty-two of the specific diseases in the data set. Two dummy variables were
created. One, labeled INTRO, indicated that a bill supporting additional research on a
specific disease had been introduced in that Congress; the other, PASSED, indicated
that a bill pertaining to that specific disease had become public law. Our goal was to
test the hypothesis that members of Congress directly affect the research allocation
decisions of the N.I.H. by either introducing or passing legislation. The equation in
Model One was modified to include these additional variables:
LNFUNDS,, = f t + ^LNDEATHS .,.3 + £LO B3t., + £BILL, + e, (4. lc)
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where in Estimate One:
nn

t

_ {1 if a bill supporting research in disease i was introduced
" 10 otherwise

and in Estimate Two:
qtt

r

f 1 if a bill specifically designating research on disease i passed
■" (0 otherwise

The remaining variables have the same interpretation as they did in Equation 4.1.
The results of the modified regression, shown in Table 4.4, do not support the
hypothesis that the N.I.H. altered 1999 research allocations in response to
Congressional interest in pushing research on a particular disease. While there were a
number of bills introduced recommending increases in funding for particular diseases,
very few passed into law. These few did not have enough impact to substantially
affect the distribution of funds by the N.I.H. Neither INTRO nor PASSED was
significant in any regression.

Table 4.4
Regression Including Legislative Variables
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding
Variable
t-statistic
Estimate 1
Estimate 2
Intercept
9.1451
19.88*
9.1471
Lndeath
0.2257
4.20
0.2260
Lob
0.3608
0.76
0.3974
0.6557
Lobl
1.22
0.6721
Lob2
1.2021
2.83*
1.2378
Comm
0.4466
0.96
0.4479
BILL (Intro)
0.0829
0.22
BILL (Passed)
0.0436
R*
0.5727
0.5721
•significant at the 0.01 level

t-statistic
19.83*
4.20*
0.91
1.26
3.17*
0.96
-

-0.08

As in the earlier regression, LOB2 continued to be both significant and
positive. An examination of the relationship between lobbying and the introduction or
passage o f bills was informative, as there was a significant, positive correlation
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between both INTRO and LOB2 and between PASSED and LOB2.

Separate

regressions using INTRO and PASSED in place o f LOB2 still did not produce
estimates which were significant. It is logical that lobbying affects the introduction
and passage o f bills in Congress. The relationship between the introduction of bills
and the direction of N.I.H. spending is less clear.

4J Regression Analysis Using Years of Life Lost Data
The regression model was altered by using years of life lost (YLL) as the
measure o f burden of disease instead of total deaths from a disease. Years of life lost is
calculated as follows:
x*l

YLL

(4.2a)
x -0

where x
1

=age
= the last age group

ex = life expectancy at age x in the United States in 1996
dx = deaths at age x in the United States in 1996
The age groups are those used by the Centers for Disease Control in its WONDER
Mortality Database. Twelve groups were used; the youngest group is “under 1 year”
and the oldest group is “over 85 years”. The life expectancy used was that provided by
the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. In this calculation for YLL, both
decreases in the age of death and increases in the number of deaths will cause years of
life lost to become larger. Thus resulting equation, Model Two, was estimated as
LNFUNDS, = A + A L N Y L L ^ * &LOB,, + /^LOBl,., +
ALOB2,., + &COMM + e,
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where LNYLL = log of years o f life lost to disease i in 1996, and LOB, LOB1, LOB2
and COMM have the same definitions as in Equation 4.1.
The results for Model Two are shown in Table 4.5, and are almost identical to
those of Model One. The R2 is 0.5586, with the overall F-value being 9.11. The
variables have the same sign, the same significance, and almost the same coefficients
as in the model using total deaths as the measure of burden of disease. Years of life
lost as a measure o f the burden of disease does not appear to be any more or any less
important to the N.I.H. than total deaths from a disease. Thus we cannot infer that the
N.I.H. places more emphasis on researching the diseases that kill younger people as
opposed to the elderly.

Table 4.5
Cross Section Model Two
Using Years of Life Lost as Explanatory Variable
________________ Dependent Variable = Log of Funding________________
F-Value
9.11
R2
0.5586
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Intercept
8.4337
13.42*
Lnyll
0.2299
4.08*
Lob
0.4243
0.98
Lobl
0.6307
1.19
Lob2
1.2840
3.43*
Comm
0.4319
0.92
•significant at the 0.01 level
4.4 Regression Analysis Using Hospital Discharge Data
The third regression model, Model Three, used the number of hospital
discharges for each of the disease codes during the year 1996 as the measure of burden
of disease. The equation estimated was:
LNFUNDSit = $ + &LNDISCHM + &LOB2,., + e,

(4.3)
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where LNDISCH was the log o f hospital discharges having a first-listed diagnosis
code corresponding to disease i. Hospitals code each patient by the primary cause
requiring hospitalization. This information is then collected for use in the National
Hospital Discharge Survey. The LOB2 variable has the same definition as before, that
is, lobbying expenditures greater than $200,000. LOB, LOB1, and COMM were
dropped from this model, because they were never significant and they reduced the
degrees of freedom below thirty unnecessarily. The results are shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6
Cross Section Model Three
Using Hospital Discharges as Explanatory Variable
________________ Dependent Variable = Log of Funding_______________
F-Value
10.51
R2
0.4040
Estimate
Variable
t-statistic
Intercept
10.3205
20.47*
Lndisch
0.2496
2.12**
Lob2
1.0758
2.49**
•significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 evel.
The National Hospital Discharge Survey provided data on the number of
discharges for thirty-four of the forty-two diseases in the cross section.

Data on

discharges for chronic fatigue syndrome, sexually transmitted diseases, malaria,
autism, ALS, sudden infant death syndrome, cervical cancer, and epilepsy were not
collected by the National Center for Health Statistics. However, the results of this
regression were still quite similar to those of Models One and Two. The overall
model R2 was lower, 0.4040, but the variables retained their signs and significance.
Hospital discharges had a similar elasticity to both total deaths or years of life lost
with respect to disease research funding; when hospital discharges increased one
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percent, funding increased 0.25 percent. Lobbying was only slightly less profitable
than in earlier models.

4.5 Regression Analysis Using Combined Data
Combined regressions were performed using various combinations of deaths,
hospital discharges, and years of life lost. However, these variables are so highly
correlated that only one measure of the burden of disease was ever significant in any
equation. Pearson correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4.7. The results of these
combined regressions are shown in Table 4.8.

Variable
Lndeaths
Lnyll
Lndisch

Table 4.7
Combined Model Correlation Coefficients
(Prob> 1r I und erHe: Rho = 0)
lnyll
Indeaths
1.0000
0.9778
<.0001
0.9778
1.0000
<.0001
0.6990
0.6678
<.0001
<.0001

Table 4.8
Combined Model Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding
Variable
Estimate
Intercept
9.5314
Lndeaths
0.3694
Lnyll
-0.1206
Lndisch
0.0042
Lob2
1.0222
Comm
0.1265
*significant at the 0.01 level.

lndisch
0.6990
<.0001
0.6678
<.0001
1.0000

t-statistic
6.22*
1.07
-0.33
0.03
2.53*
0.24

Hospital discharges became insignificant, whether combined with deaths, years
of life lost, or both. Also, deaths and years of life lost are so closely correlated
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.977) that both became insignificant when used
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together. As in previous regressions, COMM was never significant, and LOB2 always
significant. No added information was gained from combining the models.

4.6 Cost of Illness Analysis
Another important measure of the burden of disease on American families is
the cost of treating the disease.

Estimates of the direct costs of treating various

diseases are shown in Table 4.9. These estimates are taken from a report entitled
Disease-Specific Estimates of Direct and Indirect Costs of Illness and N.I.H. Support”
prepared by the N.I.H. in response to a request

by the Senate Committee on

Appropriations (Senate Report 103-318) seeking an explanation of the societal costs of
various diseases.

The report was compiled from data obtained by the separate

Institutes and allows wide flexibility in the computation of both direct and indirect
costs, resulting in cost estimates that are “uneven and essentially non-comparable.’'4
The N.I.H. does not view economic costs as a significant factor to evaluate when
making research funding allocation decisions.5 However, an examination of the
relationship between research funding on a disease and the cost of treatment for that
disease is informative, as even crude cost estimates provide another valuable measure
of the burden of disease on society.
Another data set was compiled using the information in the Cost of Illness
report. It was not possible to use the same forty-two diseases as were used previously,
because cost data was not available for all of them. The cost estimate data set contains
twenty-six o f the original forty-two diseases, plus six additional diseases for which

* Office of the Director, “Disease-Specific Estimates o f Direct and Indirect Costs o f Illness and N.I.H.
Support,” Bethesda, Md.: N.I.H., 1997, p. 2.
5 Disease-Specific Estimates, p4.
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Table 4.9
Cost of Illness Data
Disease
Funds*
Direct Costs*
Deaths
Allergic Rhinitis
$
1,020
$ 1,211,000
1
Alzheimer’s
244,000
9,345,800
21,397
Arthritis
143,340
10,833,900
2,908
Asthma
8,427
7,648,200
5,667
Cancer
2,027,190
21,040,600
539,508
Breast Cancer
284,930
5,049,700
43,447
Cervical Cancer
45,140
459,100
4,540
Colorectal Cancer
105,580
4,973,200
56,496
Lung Cancer
97,900
3,902,100
152,007
Ovarian Cancer
688,600
39,260
13,342
Prostate Cancer
106,540
3,596,000
34,122
Stroke
111,640
17,362,000
153,041
Liver Disease
119,090
1,115,200
28,881
COPD
59,840
13,251,500
98,647
Diabetes
274,670
27,276,600
61,766
Gallbladder
7,620
4,089,200
2,816
Peptic Ulcer
6,240
3,345,700
1,958
Epilepsy
49,040
2,138,300
1,338
Cardiovascular
753,900
61,104,400
733,262
HIV/Aids
76,050
8,043,200
31,123
Spinal Cord Injury
95,320
7,127,600
5,821
Kidney Disease
186,070
24,349,400
30,586
Multiple Sclerosis
57,920
1,835,500
2,291
Obesity
97,000
33,858,300
2,097
Osteoporosis
82,050
9,055,100
1,172
Otitis Media
4,860
2,006,900
37
Parkinson’s
79,410
1,425,500
11,845
Pneumonia/Flu
44,660
11,164,500
83,717
Psoriasis
3,120
2,024,300
17
Septicemia
9,900
3,006,100
21,679
Sickle Cell
30,310
393,700
507
Tuberculosis
43,760
514,000
1,202
Source: Office o f the Director, Estimate of Direct and Indirect Costs of Illness
and N.I.H. Support. *in thousands of 1984 dollars.
both cost and funding data were available. The diseases included in this data set are
also shown in Table 4.9. The table also shows the deaths from each disease.

The

analysis was limited to direct economic costs of treatment, as the methods of
calculating indirect costs were too inconsistent to permit their use.
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A regression analysis was performed using the following equation:
LNFUNDSit =

+ £LNCOSTit.3+ e,

(4.4)

where
LNFUNDSu

= Log of 1999 research funding for disease i

LNCOSTjt-j

= Log of 1996 direct costs of treating disease i

The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 4.10. The model has
an R2o f 0.2982 and an overall F-statistic of 12.75. The coefficient of LNCOST is
positive and significant, with an estimate of 0.6839. This estimate represents the
elasticity of funding with respect to direct cost of treatment, so that a one-percent
increase in costs causes a 0.6839 percent increase in funding for that disease. This
result is consistent with the results obtained using the larger cross-sectional data set of
forty-two diseases with the other measure of burden of disease. Given the N.I.H.’s
claim that it does not consider the cost of treating an illness as a criterion for allocating
research funding, this result is surprising. But the cost of treatment may be serving as a
proxy for omitted variables.

For example, there is a strong positive relationship

between funding and cost of treatment.

Table 4.10
Cost of Illness Regression Results
Dependent Variable - Log of Funding
F Value 12.75
R2
0.2748
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Intercept
-3.7709
-9.93*
Lncost
0.6839
3.57*
*significant at the 0.01 level
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4.7 Conclusions
These regressions reveal that the National Institutes of Health is behaving
rationally when allocating research funds. Allocations are highly correlated with both
total deaths from a disease and years of life lost to a disease. Both of these findings
are consistent with previous research.

However, we find that allocation is also

responsive to hospitalization required by a disease; this was not found to be the case in
the only recent other recent study of N.I.H. distribution of research funds (Gross et
al.).

Using the direct cost of treatment for a disease as a measure of the burden of

disease exhibited rather low explanatory power in explaining funding, when compared
to the other measures of burden of disease. The N.I.H. does not assign much weight to
the cost of treating a disease, even though it is a valid element of the burden of disease
and, therefore, part of the public interest theory paradigm.
Neither the impact of special interest groups nor public interest variables has
really been studied in this context before. We find that the N.I.H. does respond to
political pressure from special interest groups; lobbying plays a role in budget
allocations. Given that the N.I.H. is a government agency responsible to politicians,
this is not a surprise. What is surprising is that the communicability of a disease does
not appear to increase research funding on that disease. We should note that while the
Congressional bills introduced and bills passed did not influence current funding, this
negative finding should be cushioned by the fact that political influence may occur in
Congressional Committees rather than on the floor of Congress. We consider this
subject in the next chapter.
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CHAPTERS

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH FUNDS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the allocation of N.I.H. research funding across the fifty
states for the most recent year data is available.

This allows us to measure the

influences of Congressional politics on funding allocation while holding the influence
of important state characteristics constant. It is also informative to determine what
state characteristics have a significant impact on N.I.H. funding decisions. The
equation to be estimated in this case is:
LNFUNDSit= F (State Characteristicsi.i, Congressional Politics,.i)

where State Characteristics are:
LNFUNDSj

= N.I.H. research funding for state i in1999

LNPOPi

= Log of population of state / in 1998

LMDj

= Log of number of Medical Doctors in state i in 1998

MEDS,

= Medical Schools in state t
1 if State has a Tier 1 or Tier 2 research university
0 otherwise

TIER

= Number of teaching hospitals in state i

COTHj

and Congressional Politics are ( for 105th Congress):
CHM = (* ^ Committee chairman is from state i
' 10 otherwise

'

11 if Ranking committee member is from state i
10 otherwise

SUB - (11 if subcommittee chairman is from state i
■~ 10
0 otherwise

100
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cijTxj _ 11 if Senator from state / is on Senate Finance Committee
' “ {0 otherwise
1 if Senator from state i is on Senate Health, Education, Labor and
SHELF = Pensions Committee
0 otherwise
HWMj = Number o f Representatives from state i on House Ways and Means
Committee
HAPPj = Number o f Representatives from state i on House Appropriations Committee
HCOMj = Number of Representatives from state i on House Commerce Committee

5.2 State Characteristics Variables
The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of 1999 N.I.H. research
funding awarded to state i. There are a number of state characteristics that must be
considered when evaluating research funding distribution.

States with larger

populations are likely to receive more funding from the N.I.H. than smaller states
because of more research grant proposals or larger Congressional delegations.
Therefore state population is included as an explanatory variable.

However,

differences in population cannot completely explain the variation in funding across
states, as shown in Figure 5.1. The figure plots the log o f per capita funding for the
states receiving the most and the least funding in 1999. As Figure 5.1 shows, there is
still a large variation in funding awarded to each state even after adjusting for
population.
States which have a higher number of doctors are likely to submit more
research proposals to the N.I.H., and the proportion of awards made to MDs has risen
over the last fifteen years. We expect that greater numbers of MDs will cause an
increase in funding to that state, but we recognize that the number o f MDs is
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Figure 5.1: Log of Funding Per Capita (1999) by State. Source: Office of Extramural Research, N.I.H. Awards by State.
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positively correlated with state population, so the measured effect of MDs may be
reduced due to multicollinearity. Similarly, much research is carried out at accredited
teaching hospitals, so the variable COTH, which is the number of hospitals in the state
accredited by the American Association of Medical Colleges Council on Teaching
Hospitals, should have a positive sign in a regression estimation.
The quality of research institutions in the state is another factor which should
logically influence the amount of research money a state gets. Data on the ranking of
research universities was obtained from the Princeton Review (1998).

TIER is a

dummy variable indicating the presence of Tier 1 and Tier 2 research universities in
each state. MEDS measures the number of accredited medical schools in the state,
according to the American Association of Medical Colleges. Frequently, a medical
school is part of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 institution, so these variables are correlated with
MEDS. We expect that all three of these variables should have a positive impact on
funding.

5J Congressional Politics Variables
A number of variables were constructed to attempt to measure Congressional
influence in the distribution of N.I.H. research awards among the states.

There are

two Senate Committees and three House of Representatives Committees which have
some control over health issues in general or the N.I.H. in particular. Membership,
chairmen, and ranking member statistics are for the 105th Congress elected in 1996.
Do the states with positions on these powerful committees receive additional funding?
The Senate Finance Committee is primarily known as the tax-writing body of
the Senate, but it also oversees general health care policies and issues. The committee
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chairman was Roth (R-Delaware) and the ranking member was Moynihan (D-New
York). The Subcommittee on Health Care chairman was Craig (R-Idaho) and the
ranking member was Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). There are sixteen members on the
Finance Committee.
The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee is specifically
responsible for public health and biomedical research and development, among many
other responsibilities.

The chairman was Jeffords (R-Vermont) and the ranking

member was Kennedy (D-Massachusetts).

There are three subcommittees which

influence the National Institutes of Health: Aging, Children and Families, and Public
Health. The chairman o f the Aging Subcommittee was DeWine (R-Ohio), and the
ranking member was Mikulski (D-Maryland).

For Children and Families, the

chairman was Gregg (R-New Hampshire), and the ranking member was Dodd (DConnecticut). Finally, the chairman of the Public Health Subcommittee was Frist (RTennessee), and the ranking member was Kennedy (D-Massachusetts).
In the House of Representatives, the three committees which affect the N.I.H.
are Appropriations, Commerce, and less directly, Ways and Means. The
Appropriations Committee sets the budget for the N.I.H. It was chaired by Young (RFlorida), while the ranking member was Obey (D-Wisconsin). The Labor, Health and
Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee was chaired by
Porter (R-Dlinois) and ranking member Obey.
The House Commerce Committee has primary responsibility for overseeing
and directing federal health care issues, including biomedical research. The chairm an
was Bliley (R-Virginia) and the ranking member was Dingell (D-Michigan). The
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Health and Environment Subcommittee was chaired by Bilirakis (R-Florida) and the
ranking member was Brown (D-Ohio).
Finally, the House Ways and Means Committee controls matters relating to
health care payments made by the government and public health delivery systems. Its
chairman was Archer (R-Texas) and the ranking member was Rangel (D-New York).
The Health Subcommittee was chaired by Thomas (R-Califomia), with the ranking
member being Stark (D-Califomia).
We have constructed several variables to determine if positions on these
committees and subcommittees affects the distribution of awards. The variable CHM
is a dummy variable indicating that a delegate from state i is chairman of a committee.
SUB indicates that a delegate from state / is chairman of a subcommittee. RANK
indicates that a delegate from state i is the ranking members of a committee or relevant
subcommittee.

Finally, the variables SFIN, SHELP, HAPP, HCOM, and HWM

measure membership on one of the five committees with some influence over the
N.I.H. or health care. If members o f Congress use their positions to help institutions
in their states receive grants, then we would expect all or some of these variables to
have positive signs.

5.4 Regression Results
The results of the geographic distribution regression are shown in Table 5.1.
The model has an R2 of 0.8957, telling us that the model explains the great majority of
the variation in funding across states. The model is in logarithmic form, so the
coefficients represent elasticities. As expected, LNPOP has a significant positive
impact on the funding a state receives. The elasticity of funding with respect to
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population is 1.1729; an increase of one percent in population causes an increase in
funding of slightly more than 1.17 percent. Surprisingly, the coefficient on LMD is
also significant and positive. An increase of one percent in the number of doctors
causes a 1.2921 percent increase in research funding. States with a higher number of
doctors do receive additional funding, and an increase in the number of doctors is
slightly more important than an increase in population.

Variable
Intercept
Lnpop
Lmd
Tier
Chm
Sub
Rank
Shelp
Sfin
Happ
Hcom
Hwm

Table 5.1
Results of Geographic Regression
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding
F-Value 39.26
R2
0.8957
Estimate
-5.5379
1.1729
1.2921
0.6477
0.0480
-0.3261
0.1480
0.6769
-0.2628
-0.0587
-0.0218
0.0945

t-statistic
-2.43*
6.74*
3.02*
2.96*
0.14
-1.25
0.58
3.56*
-1.37
-0.47
-0.19
0.76

*significant at the 0.01 level
Evidently, the quantity of research institutions does not drive funding
allocations. Neither the number o f medical schools (MEDS) nor the number of
teaching hospitals (COTH) was ever significant.
The presence o f a Tier 1 or Tier 2 research university has a significant positive
effect on funding, as expected; apparently, the quality of research institutions does
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matter. States with high-quality institutions are getting more research dollars than
states without such institutions.
Among the Congressional variables, neither the holding of a chairmanship
(CHM, SUB) nor being the ranking member (RANK) was significant.

For the

committee membership variables, only membership on the Senate Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions Committee had a significant positive influence on state funding.
Membership on the House Ways and Means (HWM) Committee was sometimes
weakly significant.
While these results indicate that contemporary leadership and membership on
Congressional committees does not play a major role in the allocation of N.I.H.
research funding across the states, it must be remembered that the N.I.H. is subject to
incremental budgeting and that the current allocation of N.I.H. funds across the states
may have been influenced by the leadership and membership composition of
Congressional Committees from earlier years.

5.5 Conclusions
There is some objective justification for the discrepancies in funding across
states. States with larger populations, more doctors and nationally respected research
universities receive more funds than other states. However, Congressional influence
seems to play a role in funding distribution, as states which have membership on the
Senate HELP committee have higher funding. As we concluded in Chapter 4, the
N.I.H. is behaving rationally when allocating funds.
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CHAPTER6
REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING MICRO-DATA
6.1 Introduction
In addition to the data on N.I.H. research funding per disease which was
analyzed earlier, another data set was compiled using micro-level data. The N.I.H.
maintains a database on government-funded research projects entitled Computer
Retrieval of Information on Scientific Programs (CRISP). Each individual research
project funded by the N.I.H. is entered into this database by title, author, and subject.
It is possible to do a subject search for each disease o f interest to retrieve the grants
awarded to do research on that disease.
A year-by-year search o f the CRISP database was performed in order to
duplicate the data on research funding collected earlier.

Entering the subject

“Alzheimer’s disease” and the year “ 1990”, for example, will result in 458 hits. Each
hit represents a research project on Alzheimer’s disease.

This process was repeated

for each o f the twenty-one diseases in the original data set for the years 1987 - 2001.
The diseases are listed in Table 6.1.
The number of grants awarded in a given subject area is a crude measure of the
emphasis placed on that disease by the N.I.H.

It is possible for a grant to have

multiple subject listings; for example, a research project may cover two or more
related diseases. There is no way to prevent this double counting when using the
CRISP data set; however, there is no reason to believe that projects in any one disease
area are more or less likely to contain multiple subjects than projects in any other area.
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IS Year Data
Alzheimer’s
Asthma
Breast Cancer
Chronic Fatigue
Cystic Fibrosis
Diabetes
Epstein-Barr
HIV/Aids
Hypertension
Kidney Disease
Lupus
Osteoporosis
Parkinson’s
Prostate Cancer
STD’s
Sickle Cell
Spinal Cord
Stroke
SIDS
Tuberculosis

Table 6.1
Diseases in Data Sets
10 Year Data
Alzheimer’s
Asthma
Breast Cancer
All Cancer
Chronic Fatigue
Cystic Fibrosis
Diabetes
Epstein Barr
HIV/Aids
Hypertension
Kidney
Lupus
Osteoporosis
Parkinson’s
Prostate Cancer
STD’s
Sickle Cell
Spinal Cord
Stroke
SIDS
Tuberculosis
COPD
Liver Disease
Lung Cancer
Pneumonia/Influenza
Schizophrenia

1999 Cross Section
Alzheimer’s
Asthma
Breast Cancer
Cancer
Cardiovascular
Chronic Fatigue
Cystic Fibrosis
Diabetes
Epstein Barr
HIV/Aids
Hypertension
Kidney Disease
Lupus
Osteoporosis
Parkinson’s
Prostate Cancer
STD’s
Sickle Cell
Spinal Cord
Stroke
SIDS
Tuberculosis
COPD
Liver Disease
Lung Cancer
Pneumonia/Influenza
Schizophrenia
ALS
Arthritis
Autism
Ovarian Cancer
Fibromyalgia
Hepatitis C
Malaria
Multiple Sclerosis
Muscular Dystrophy
Nutritional Problems
Obesity
Cervical Cancer
Colorectal Cancer
Epilepsy
Septicemia
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The number of awards included in this analysis is quite large, varying from about
8,800 in 1987 to slightly over 31,000 in 2000.
6.2 Fifteen Year Pooled Data Regression

A regression was performed using the number of grants awarded in a disease
area as the dependent variable for the years 1987-2001. The model was specified to
be a one-way fixed effects model, which allows the intercept to vary across diseases
but not over time. The omitted disease is tuberculosis, as it was in the earlier panel
data regressions. The equation estimated for Model One was:
N -I

LNGRANTSU= /?, + ! ^ D jt + ftY R + ftD RATIO,., + ftD Y R +

(6.1)

ftDYRDTHit + ftCDEM + ftPD EM +eit
where
LNGRANTSu = the log of the number of grants to disease i in year t
DRATIOjt-j

= the number of deaths from disease i in year t divided by the total
number of deaths for all diseases in year t

YR

= time trend

rj _ 11 if disease i=j
j‘ 10 otherwise
n v n - f 1 if the year is 1999,2000,2001
UYK 10 otherwise
DYRDTHit

= DYR*DRATIOit-3

r n P w _ f 1 if Democrats control the Congress in year t-1
™
t-'
\0 otherwise
Dr,Cw _ (1 if the President is a Democrat
- o otherwise
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The dependent variable is LNGRANTS, which is the log of the number of
grants awarded in a particular disease area each year. The public interest variable is
DRATIO, which is the number of deaths from disease / divided by the total number of
deaths each year from all included diseases. Using this measure of the burden of
disease prevents increases in the number of deaths each year from affecting the results.
A glance at Figure 6.1, Total Dataset Grants Over Time, shows that the
number of grants increased over the period. We include a time trend, YR, to capture
the incremental budgeting effect. In addition, there are several distinct breaks in the
curve. We attempted to explain these changes using dummy variables. In 1998

Grants

40000:

30000

ioooo :

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year

Figure 6.1: Total Dataset Grants Over Time. Source: Office of Extramural
Research, Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects.
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Congress voted to establish a goal of doubling the N.I.H. budget between 1999 and
2003. The dummy variable DYR takes the value of one for the years 1999, 2000, and
2001, and is zero in earlier years. The DYR variable measures the impact of this
decision by Congress on the various diseases. The DYRDTH variable captures any
interaction between DRATIO and DYR.
Two political dummy variables are included:

CDEM and PDEM.

These

variables measure Democratic party control over the Congress and the Presidency,
respectively, during the year when budget decisions are made (t-1). If the Democrats
have control, the variables have a value of one; otherwise they take the value of zero.
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate were controlled by Democrats from
1986-1994; after the elections in 1994, both bodies were controlled by Republicans
(1995-2000). The President was a Republican from 1986-1992 and a Democrat from
1993-2000.
The results of this regression are presented in Table 6.2, along with the results
of the original regression over this same time period. The regression using CRISP
data performs reasonably well; it has an R2 of 0.7912. The cross-sectional (diseasespecific) intercept effects are almost identical; thirteen of the same eighteen diseases
have intercepts which differ significantly from that of tuberculosis, and the signs are
the same as those is the funding regression in Chapter 3. There are two differences in
the CRISP regression and the funding regression: first, the sign for SIDS is positive in
the funding regression, but negative in the CRISP regression. The explanation for this
may lie in the crudeness of the number of grants as a measure of allocation, or in the
method of retrieving the number o f grants (searching by disease subject listing). The
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Table 6.2
Comparison of Fifteen Year Data Regression Results
Dependent Variable - Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
Dependent Variable = Lotg of Funding (1Funding Model)
Variable
CRISP tfodel
Funding Model
t-statistic
Estimate
Estimate
t-statistic
Alzheimer’s
1.6832
7.21*
2.4993
16.24*
Asthma
0.8122
3.84*
1.1084
8.08*
Breast Cancer
1.8317
4.78*
2.4693
9.41*
-1.1483
Chronic Fatigue
-5.46*
-1.6679
-12.24*
Cystic Fibrosis
0.4546
2.16**
1.0001
7.35*
Diabetes
2.1290
5.02*
2.7550
9.42*
Epstein-Barr
0.0370
0.18
-0.0437
-0.32
2.2844
HIV/Aids
8.66*
4.0043
22.64*
1.9407
Hypertension
8.86*
2.0703
14.39*
Kidney Disease
2.1190
7.20*
11.27*
2.2381
Lupus
0.3320
1.58
0.4329
3.18*
Osteoporosis
0.5376
2.56**
1.4129
10.38*
Parkinson’s
0.7095
3.28*
1.2938
9.19*
Prostate Cancer
0.9392
3.01*
1.0357
4.90*
STD’s
0.2735
1.30
1.5348
11.26*
Sickle Cell
0.3462
1.65
0.8206
6.03*
Spinal Cord
1.1927
5.63*
0.9156
6.66*
Stroke
1.4826
1.30
1.7077
2.14**
SIDS
-1.2022
-5.69*
0.7814
5.70*
Intercept
3.8530
15.89*
8.6366
54.98*
Yr
0.1071
4.74*
0.1006
6.88*
Dratio
-0.8960
-0.31
-0.2619
-0.06
Dyr
0.6683
4.97*
0.1130
-1.30
Dyrdth
0.3175
0.32
1.2010
0.88
Cdem
0.3432
2.63*
0.1741
2.06**
Pdem
-0.2025
-1.40
-0.0053
-0.06
*significant at the 0.01 level. “ significant at the 0.05 level.
other difference is that in the funding regression, the intercepts for lupus, sickle cell
disease, sexually transmitted diseases, and stroke do vary significantly from that of
tuberculosis, while in the CRISP regression, this is not the case.
Another similarity between the regression using CRISP data and that using
research funding is that in both regressions, the time trend is significant and positive,
supporting the incremental budgeting theory. With disease dummy variables included
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in the model, the number of deaths from a disease has no explanatory power; DRATIO
is not significant in either model.

This lack of significance for DRATIO was

confirmed using joint F-tests for DRATIO and DYRDTH. PDEM is never significant
in the fifteen year models.
The political dummy variable CDEM, which measures the effect of
Democratic control of Congress during the period, is positive and significant in both
models.

This give us important additional evidence that politics does matter in

determining funding; both models show a decrease in funding after the Republicans
took control of Congress.
The dummy variable DYR is positive and significant in the CRISP model, but
not in the funding model. The decision by Congress to substantially increase N.I.H.
funding beginning in 1999 had a positive impact on the number of grants. The
discrepancy between the CRISP result and the funding model result on this variable
may be due to the crudeness of number of grants as a funding estimate, or the number
of grants may have varied more than the amount of funding at that time. DYRDTH is
not significant in either model. Overall, the CRISP data confirms the results of our
earlier estimation using funding dollars as the dependent variable.

6J Ten Year Pooled Data Regression
The CRISP data was expanded to include twenty-seven diseases for the years
1992-2001, to provide a basis for comparison with the ten year data set regressions
results presented earlier. The diseases are listed in Table 6.1. The equation estim ated
below for Model Two was the same as that estimated previously in Equation 6.1; all of
the variables have the same meanings.
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The results for this ten year panel data are shown in Table 6.3, along with the
results from the ten year regression using dollar funding. The CRISP model has an R2

Table 6.3
Comparison of Ten Year Data Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
_________ Dependent Variable = Log of Funding (Funding Model)__________
CIRSP Model
Funding Model
Variable
Estimate
t-statistic
Estimate
t-statistic
Alzheimer’s
1.2490
4.32*
1.8360
20.65*
Asthma
1.64
0.4181
0.4942
6.29*
Breast Cancer
1.2150
2.76*
2.0042
14.80*
Cardiovascular
-0.11
-0.6581
3.3323
1.73
-6.14*
Chronic Fatigue
-1.5573
-2.2042
-28.26*
Cystic Fibrosis
0.28
0.1888
0.0721
2.42**
Diabetes
1.8837
11.64*
1.3406
2.55**
Epstein-Barr
-1.77
-0.4482
-0.9128
-11.70*
HIV/Aids
1.7492
5.03*
3.3099
30.94*
Hypertension
4.91*
1.3099
1.1772
14.33*
Kidney Disease
1.3027
3.77*
1.3837
13.01*
Lupus
-0.2470
-0.98
-0.4289
-5.51*
Osteoporosis
0.77
0.1959
0.7117
9.14*
Parkinson’s
1.04
0.2743
0.5486
6.79*
Prostate Cancer
0.4698
0.6717
1.26
5.85*
STD’s
-0.1508
-0.60
-0.7222
9.26*
Sickle Cell
-0.1778
-0.70
-0.0715
-0.92
Spinal Cord
0.5766
2.26**
0.0222
0.28
Stroke
0.3569
0.28
1.0084
2.61*
SIDS
-1.7631
-6.93*
-0.1335
-1.71
COPD
-1.57
-1.2820
0.0046
0.02
Liver Disease
1.0003
2.88*
1.1560
10.82*
Lung Cancer
0.24
0.3101
0.9540
2.42**
Pneumonia/Influenza
0.14
0.1051
0.1368
0.60
Schizophenia
0.6364
2.51**
0.9379
12.03*
Intercept
11.67*
3.4403
10.1988
125.66*
Yr
4.4088
0.0467
8.63*
3.06*
Dratio
0.4284
0.35
-0.7688
-0.20
-0.2859
-1.61
0.0626
1.14
Dyr
Dyrdth
-0.0567
-0.06
0.0804
0.28
Cdem
1.1541
7.20*
0.0153
0.31
Pdem
-5.14*
-0.7663
0.0277
0.60
♦significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
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of 0.7993. The cross-sectional effects are somewhat different in the two models. In
the CRISP regression, only eleven diseases have intercepts which differ significantly
from that of tuberculosis, compared to nineteen in the funding data regression. The
signs on the significant coefficients are the same in both models.
The time trend is positive and significant in the both the regression using
CRISP grants and the regression using funding dollars as the dependent variable,
providing support for the incremental budgeting theory. Neither DYR nor DRYDTH
is significant in either model. However, the time-based political dummy variables
CDEM and PDEM are both significant in the CRISP model; only CDEM was
significant in the funding model. Given our earlier results in the fifteen year panel
data (both CRISP and funding models), these ten year CRISP data regression
estimation results lend more support to the idea that political factors do influence
funding. We certainly cannot conclude that there are no political effects at work.
Also, the public interest variable DRATIO is not significant in either model
when disease dummy variables are included in the model. While there are more
differences between the CRISP model and the funding model for the ten year data than
there are for the fifteen year data, the important result that initial levels of funding for
diseases are maintained over time (incremental budgeting) is supported by both
models; as is the result that politics matters in the funding process.

6.4 Cross-Sectional Data Regression
Finally, CRISP grant award data was used to replicate the results of the 1999
cross-sectional analysis presented earlier in Table 4.2. The diseases in the cross
section are listed in Table 6.1. The number of grants awarded in forty-two disease
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categories served as the dependent variable. The equation estimated for Model Three
was:
LNGRANTS; = + #LNDEATHSit., + A LOB, ,+ A LOB 1,., +
ALOB2,., + /?6COMM

(6.3)

where
LNGRANTSi = log of the number of grants awarded to disease i in 1999
LNDEATHSi.3 = log of the number of deaths from disease i in 1996

r n n _ i 1 ^ the disease had a registered lobbyist group which spent less than $100,000
LUB 10 otherwise
r n n , _ ( I if disease advocates spent between $100,000 and $200,000 lobbying
LUBl 10 otherwise

r n w _ f 1 if disease advocates spent over $200,000
L u a z 10 otherwise
COMM = P ^ a disease is communicable
(0 otherwise
The dependent variable is the log of the number of grants awarded to disease /
in 1999. The public interest variables are the log o f the number of deaths from disease
i in 1996 (LNDEATHS), and COMM, indicating whether or not a disease is
contagious. The special interest group variables here are LOB, LOB1, and LOB2.
LOB has a value of one if a disease has a registered lobbyist and spent less than
$100,000 lobbying during the 1997-1998 election cycle, and a value of zero otherwise.
LOB1 represents lobbying expenditures between $100,000 and $200,000, and LOB2
represents lobbying expense above $200,000 during the 1997-1998 election cycle. It
is not possible to use CDEM and PDEM in a cross-sectional analysis, because the
controlling party does not change.
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The results of the cross-sectional regression are presented in Table 6.4, along
with the results of the earlier regression using funding as the dependent variable.
There are some differences. The CRISP model has a much smaller Rz, 0.4001 versus
0.5721 for the funding model. However, in both models, the public interest variables
have the same signs and significance. LNDEATHS is positive and significant, as
expected, indicating that both funding levels among diseases and the number of grants
awarded in 1999 are related to the burden of disease on the public.

LOB2 is

significant and positive in both models; the other special interest group variables are
always insignificant. Very low levels of lobbying do not appear to result in additional
funding for any disease, while high lobbying levels do provide a reward.

Table 6.4
Comparison of Cross Sectional Data Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
__________ Dependent Variable = Log of Funding (Funding Model)__________
Variable
Funding Model
CRIS1* Model
Estimate
t-statistic
t-statistic
Estimate
Intercept
4.7794
11.33*
9.1447
20.14*
0.1400
Lndeaths
2.83*
0.2264
4.28*
Lob
0.0704
0.18
0.4029
0.95
Lobl
0.6511
1.35
0.6728
1.28
Lob2
0.8750
2.55**
1.2466
3.37*
Comm
0.3382
0.80
0.4453
0.97
•significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
The CRISP data was also used to replicate the cross-sectional regressions using
years of life lost (YLL) and the number of hospital discharges (DISCHARGES) as
explanatory variables. The results o f the estimation using YLL is shown in Table 6.5.
The CRISP regression reproduces the results using funding as the dependent variable
quite well. Both the burden of disease measure, years of life lost (LNYLL), and
LOB2, representing large lobbying dollar amounts, were significant and positive in
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Table 6.5
Comparison of Cross Section Results Using YLL
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding (Funding Model)
Variable
CRIS P Model
Funding Model
Estimate
t-statistic
Estimate
t-statistic
Intercept
4.4334
8.4337
7.53*
13.42*
0.2299
Lnyll
0.1329
2.51**
4.08*
Lob
0.0895
0.22
0.4243
0.98
Lobl
0.6307
1.19
0.6145
1.25
Lob2
2.64**
0.9172
1.2840
3.43*
Comm
0.3367
0.78
0.4319
0.92
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
both regressions.

The remaining variables, LOB, LOB1, and COMM, were not

significant in either regression.
The estimation of the hospital discharge equation was also repeated using the
number of grants as the dependent variable. These results are shown in Table 6.6.
Once again, the reduced number o f cross-sectional observations (thirty-four), made it
necessary to eliminate some explanatory variables. Consequently, only discharges
(LNDISCH), the large lobbying variable (LOB2), and the contagious disease variable
(COMM) were included in this estimation. The results using the CRISP grant data are
similar to the results achieved using the funding data.

Lobbying has a positive,

significant impact on funding in both models. COMM is not significant in either
model.

Surprisingly, the coefficient on discharges (LNDISCH) is not significant in

the model using CRISP data, whereas it is significant in the funding model. This
represents the only major difference in the cross-sectional results between the CRISP
models and the models using funding as the dependent variable.
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Table 6.6
Comparison of Cross Section Results Using Discharges
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
Dependent Variable - Log of Funding (Funding Model)
Variable
CRIS P Model
Funding Model
Estimate
t-statistic
Estimate
t-statistic
Intercept
10.2517
19.57*
5.6812
12.38*
0.1249
1.19
2.14**
Lndisch
0.2560
0.7079
1.87**
1.0814
Lob2
2.48**
0.3239
0.57
Comm
0.3098
0.63
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
6.5 Conclusions
The use of the micro-level data provided by the CRISP grants registry was
helpful in confirming the results obtained using the macro-level funding data. In all
three regressions, using fifteen year panel data, ten year panel data, and 1999 crosssectional data, the CRISP regression results generally validated our earlier results.
The level of N.I.H. funding varies significantly across the various diseases. When the
influence of the diseases are accounted for, the disease death ratio (DRATIO) has no
influence on N.I.H. grant decisions. When disease dummy variables are not included
in the model, the disease death ratio has a significant, positive influence on N.I.H.
grants, which is consistent with the public interest hypothesis.
The CRISP data analysis provided solid supplemental support for the
incremental budgeting theory and special interest group theory; the time trend and the
large lobbying variable were always significant and positive. In addition, the CRISP
results bolstered our confidence in the result attained with the fifteen year panel data
funding model that political factors influence funding. Considering our pooled data
CRISP models and our pooled data funding models together, we found evidence that
politics mattered in three o f the four regressions.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The National Institutes o f Health is the largest biomedical research facility in
the world, and the largest non-military research agency o f the United States federal
government. The N.I.H. received over $20 billion in tax-dollar funding for the fiscal
year 2001; the decisions made by the N.I.H. about funding priorities affect the lives of
all Americans. Consequently, an analysis o f the resource allocation process at the
N.I.H. is o f substantial interest.
Our model hypothesizes that the N.I.H. policy-makers follow a combination of
public interest, incremental budgeting, and special interest group economic theory.
They must respond to both the health care demands of the public, as well as the
political demands of Congress, the President, disease advocacy associations, patients,
and other special interest groups. Our primary goals are to determine whether the
N.I.H. is responding to the burden o f disease on the U.S. population when making
resource allocation decisions, to evaluate the role o f political and special interest
groups in the allocation process, to determine whether or not the N.I.H. follows the
incremental budgeting model, and to examine the distribution of research funds across
states as well as across diseases. We used both pooled time-series cross-sectional data
and pure cross-sectional data to perform our analyses.
When analyzing panel data on research funding for a pool of twenty-one
diseases during the period 1987-2001, we found evidence that the N.I.H. considers the
death ratio from a disease as a significant factor in making the initial funding
allocations. Our results indicated that these initial allocations are maintained over
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time, and that the N.I.H. does not alter the distribution o f funding in response to
changing death patterns. We identified persistent variations in the levels o f funding
across diseases, even after controlling for deaths. We included a time trend variable to
explicitly test for the incremental budgeting effect, and found it to be present. Our
results both substantiate and amplify the work of Niskanen (1971) and Weston (1994),
who found some evidence of incrementalism. Our study, however, is the first to use
disease-level data in this context, eliminating the institute-disease identification
problem present in the work of Mushkin (1979) and Weston (1994). We also found
that the shift from a Democratic Congress to a Republican Congress in 1995 reduced
funding.
This analysis was repeated using ten years of data (1992-2001) for twentyseven diseases. This data set included heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, pneumonia and influenza, and liver disease, which are major causes o f death
in the United States. Our study was the first to include all o f these diseases, and the
first to include all of the top ten causes o f death over the last fifteen years in the U.S.
Including these diseases in such a study greatly improves the relevance o f the results.
No previous study considered such data in this quantity or detail.

Our results

substantiate the incremental budgeting theory; after initial allocations are made, the
funding allocations do not appear to change significantly in response to deaths. We
did find, however, that the shift from a Democratic to Republican Congress did not
have a significant effect in this regression. Our results concerning political influence,
then, were mixed; however, we cannot exclude the possibility that politics plays a role
in funding allocations.
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We performed an extensive cross-sectional analysis o f the N.I.H. research
funding allocation among forty-two diseases for the fiscal year 1999. We included
four measures of the burden o f disease (deaths, years o f life lost, hospital discharges,
and communicability) as explanatory variables representing the public interest. Three
o f these measures had significant positive impacts on research funding allocations,
providing support for the argument that the N.I.H. is now allocating funds, at least in
part, in accordance with public interest theory. Our findings were slightly different
than those of Gross et al. (1999), who found that both deaths and years o f life lost
mattered, but that hospital discharges were not significant.

However, our cross-

section included fifty percent more diseases than theirs, and the disease categories
were more specific, which may account for the difference. The communicability of a
disease was not considered by Gross et al.; surprisingly, we never found it to be a
significant factor in determining research funding allocation.
Our study is the first to consider the effect o f the direct cost o f treatment
(another measure o f the burden of disease) on research funding allocations.

An

analysis of a cross-section of thirty-four diseases also found a significant, positive
relationship between the cost o f treating a disease and research funding, even though
the N.I.H. does not explicitly consider this measure o f the burden of disease when
making allocation decisions.
In addition, we expanded the 1999 cross-sectional analyses to include variables
to measure the impact o f lobbying efforts on the allocation process. We found that
diseases which had extensive Congressional lobbying expenses received additional
funding, providing support for the special interest group theory o f government
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behavior. Although Stigler (1974), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) developed
special interest group theory and applied it in other forums, ours is the first to include
a quantitative evaluation o f the effect o f lobbying on research funding at the N.I.H.
We also evaluated the effect of the introduction o f bills in Congress requesting
additional research funding for specific diseases, but found no evidence to support the
hypothesis that the introduction o f a bill affected current N.I.H. funding.
We examined the distribution o f research funding for fiscal year 2000 across
the fifty individual states to determine whether the distribution depended entirely on
quantifiable factors, or whether political factors played a role.

None o f the earlier

work on the N.I.H. considered the distribution across states. We identified six state
characteristic variables which could justify an increased level o f funding, as well as
eight Congressional political variables which might affect the funding a state receives.
Our results provided support for both the public interest and special interest group
theories of allocation. The population, number o f medical doctors and the quality of
research institutions in the state were significant and positive factors in a state’s
funding level; however, having a Senator on the Senate Health, Labor, Education, and
Pensions Committee apparently contributed to an increase in the state’s funding.
Whether this effect was entirely due to current membership on the Committee, or was
an accumulated effect incorporating membership in prior years, or whether this
variable acted a proxy for some other omitted variable, could not be determined.
Finally, we replicated our evaluations of all three o f the disease-related data
sets (fifteen-year panel, ten-year panel, and 1999 cross section) using micro-level data
obtained from the CRISP registry o f individual N.I.H. grant awards. The number of
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grants included in the study varied from 8,800 to over 31,000. Our results using
grants as the dependent variable measuring N.I.H. spending on a disease essentially
substantiated our earlier results, especially our conclusions regarding the presence of
incremental budgeting and the influence of lobbying. One result was that using the
CRISP data for both the fifteen and ten year datasets, we found evidence that the
change from a Democratic Congress to a Republican Congress reduced funding.
Thus, in three of our four pooled data regressions, we found evidence that politics
does affect research funding. This confirmation o f our macro-level results boosts our
confidence in the validity of our findings. While Lichtenberg (1996) was the first to
use CRISP data in a cross-sectional evaluation o f research funding, we have expanded
the application by incorporating panel data from the CRISP database.
A number o f additional issues remain to be examined concerning the N.I.H.
The N.I.H. is improving its record-keeping and data-processing methods in response
to Congressional and public concerns.

This, in turn, will improve our ability to

evaluate the allocation process in the future. The N.I.H. has been advised by Congress
to be more explicit in their consideration o f the burdens of disease when making
allocation decisions, and more communicative about the allocation process.
Our study does not include data on the incidence or prevalence of various
diseases, because the data available is spotty and inconsistent; for many diseases, no
government records are available for either incidence or prevalence. This is critical
information that needs to be compiled and made readily available for future
researchers in order to comprehensively evaluate public policy on research allocation
among diseases.
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The relationship between Congress and the N.I.H. warrants further study. We
hope to evaluate the role of Congress in determining changes in the direction o f N.I.H.
research. In addition, the issue o f selectivity bias needs to be addressed. We need
access to information about both the funded and unfunded N.I.H. research grant
applications to more fairly and completely analyze the research priorities o f the N.I.H.
As the population of the United States ages during the 21st century, the
National Institutes of Health will play a progressively larger role in improving the
health of the American people. A thorough understanding o f the N.I.H. decision
making process and the research agency’s priorities will be an essential part of
managing our own health, and therefore, our lives.
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Appendix A
Table A.l
Leading Causes O f Death
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

l
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease

2

3

4

5

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

Accidents

COPD

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

6
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza

10
Kidney
Disease
Kidney
Disease
Kidney
Disease
Kidney
Disease
Kidney
Disease

7

8

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

9
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease

Diabetes

Suicide

HIV/Aids

Homicide

Diabetes

HIV/Aids

Suicide

Homicide

Diabetes

HIV/Aids

Suicide

Diabetes

HIV/Aids

Suicide

Diabetes

HIV/Aids

Suicide

Homicide
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease

Homicide
HIV/Aids

Source: National Center for lealth Statistics, Vital Statistics, annual.
(table continued)
UJ
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1996
1997
1998

Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease
Heart
Disease

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Cancer

Stroke

COPD

Accidents

Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza
Pneumonia/
Influenza

Diabetes

HIV/Aids

Diabetes

Suicide

Diabetes

Suicide

Suicide
Kidney
Disease
Kidney
Disease

Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease
Liver
Disease

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics, annual.
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Appendix B
Computation Of Dummy Variable Estimates
1.

Let lny = px+ /5U + <5D+ e
where

2.

Then lny, = (/?, + S)+ /3U,. When D = I, and lny0 = /7, + /?,x0when D = 0.

3.

Then lny, - lny0 = S.

4.

Then ln(— ) = lny, - lny0 = S.
yo

5.

T h e n — = e J.
y«

6.

7.

Therefore, —— — = eJ - 1.
y0
The percent change in y = eJ - I when D= 1versus D = 0.
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Appendix C
Table C.I
N.I.H. Budget Fiscal Year 1999
Institute
Amount*
National Cancer Institute
$2,900,435
National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute
1,781,389
National Institute o f Dental and Craniofacial Research
238,163
National Institute o f Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases
996,189
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke
898,521
National Institute o f Allergy and Infectious Diseases
1,575,065
National Institute o f General Medical Sciences
1,196,798
National Institute o f Child Health and Human Development
752,909
National Eye Institute
396,634
National Institute o f Environmental Health Sciences
388,228
National Institute on Aging
599,741
National Institute o f Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases
307,080
National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders
231,295
National Institute o f Mental Health
854,640
National Institute on Drug Abuse
607,579
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
259,030
National Institute o f Nursing Research
69,985
National Human Genome Research Institute
268,901
National Center for Research Resources
554,270
National Center for Complimentary and Alternative Medicine
49,967
Fogarty International Center
35.391
National Library o f Medicine
181,131
Office o f the Director
43,436
Building and Facilities
6,100
TOTAL
515,597,189
Source: N.I.H.. http://www4.od.nih.aov/ofm/budpet/. * in thousands o 'dollars.
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Appendix D
Table D.I
N.I.H. Research Fundin I By Selected Categories
Research/Disease Areas
Amount*
AIDS
S 1,215,000
ALS
17,200
Alzheimer’s Disease
406,500
Arthritis
238,800
Asthma
140,400
Autism
40,000
Cancer
3,377,300
Breast Cancer
474,400
Lung Cancer
163,000
Ovarian Cancer
65,400
Prostate Cancer
177,500
Cardiovascular Research
1,327,100
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome
6,700
Cystic Fibrosis
71,600
Diabetes
457,600
Epstein-Barr Syndrome
27,100
Fibromyalgia
6,400
Hepatitis C
39,700
Hypertension
175,400
Kidney Disease
247,900
Lupus
46,100
Malaria
25,300
Multiple Sclerosis
96,300
Muscular Dystrophy
16,700
Nutrition
587,500
Obesity
161,400
Osteoporosis
136,700
Parkinson’s Disease
132,300
Schizophrenia
200,600
Sexually Transmitted Diseases
136,400
Sickle Cell Disease
50,400
Spinal Cord Injury
62,100
Stroke
186,000
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome
49,300
Tuberculosis
72,800
Source: N.I.H., http://www4.od.nih.gov/ofm/diseases/. * in thousands o f dollars.
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